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Preface of the paper 
  
The actualization of this paper depicts a constant comparison. A debate that 
started from within my own self concerning the philosophical substance of the paper 
and was extended throughout the paper regarding its own question that needed to 
be answered. I leave every personal approach aside as I wanted to be as objective 
as possible, focusing on the facts and on a constant comparison among the different 
cases that the US Special Forces were used as a tool of the American foreign policy 
and if the Special Forces was a better choice than the use of the conventional 
forces. 
However, the personal side of this research project is why it is important to me 
as it firstly has to do with an internal struggle. 
I grew up listening and reading all about Greek mythology where the war 
heroes held a special place among the society, they were respectful and exemplar 
figures, even after their death they were supposed to have a place in the pantheon of 
eternity. Later on, entering into adultness I had to join the Greek army, as it is 
obligatory. I even served the Special Forces, which are the main subject of this 
paper, and that was the one side of my internal struggle. The other side is that what I 
was given from my family was respect for values that had to do with personal 
integrity and equal rights among people. I would say that I am a pacifist who does 
not like the subordination of mind or any nationalist approach. 
Having this ideological adversity troubling my mind for long time I decided that 
I should better reconcile myself with the fact that states will always fight, it is in 
human nature to seek more and more power and many times this is done with 
violent outbreaks. This of course is not something new, the rationale of the definition 
of states’ behavior from and to their social environment is something that is written 
through human history and many great minds like Thucydides, Hamilton, Machiavelli, 
Hobbes or Rousseau have referred to it in their works. It seems that we will always 
live in a polarized international system which is ideologically charged influencing 
everything in macroscopic level (states) and microscopic level (human beings). 
Having this realization of all the above, I decided that I have to understand, or 
at least try to, why do we have wars, to examine this “deadly disease” that hits 
humanity every once in a while. What we need is not more self-appointed peace 
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preachers or war whisperers. What we need is knowledge, the political scientists 
who have knowledge, up to today, act like coroners examining the results of war. 
Maybe one day will have gathered enough knowledge to have the luxury of having 
“doctors of war”. This what I try to do in this paper, to combine my experience in the 
field of army forces and act like a spy from the peace side so I can gain knowledge 
on how the pieces are moving in this virtual international chessboard. 
  
 Theoretical Approach 
  
  
         Regarding the theoretical approach that I chose to use in my research, 
I would say that I did not have any other choice than to use realism as it is the one 
that matches both the actions of the USA therefore of their Special Forces and my 
view as the researcher of the topic. The theory of Realism has influenced both the 
international relations and the international system more than any other theory. The 
military actions of the US are confirmed by historical facts, something that helps us 
to shape an opinion and, at a level, psychoanalyze the American foreign policy in 
relation to the international developments. 
         According to theory of realism, the promotion of new factors in an 
international system is on the one hand a usual phenomenon but on the other hand it 
can be a potential danger. States and in particular powerful states like the US cannot 
stay inactive if they perceive that new factors are coming in this system of 
international competition. The realist approach supports that the behavior of a state 
is defined by its worry about its security as its main desire is security and of course 
its ultimate interest is its survival. 
As Kenneth Waltz says, realists support, as their universal value, that this fear 
that the states feel is a result of the international system’s anarchy. This anarchy in 
the international system and the lack of a supreme force causes insecurity among 
the states and their actions are characterized as nervous and sometimes edgy and 
unpredictable. If there was a supreme force to control everything, not letting arbitrary 
without consequences actions made by states to happen, that would allow the states 
to feel secure enough to act reasonably. However, this is not happening so the 
states cannot be sure and secure regarding the thoughts and desires among them. 
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Security is something that the states are obliged to offer to their citizens; in 
fact it is something that needs to be defended in any way and sometimes this can 
lead to war. The theory of realism says that it is not necessary for a state to go to 
war in order to be secure but if peace is the ultimate good then every action made in 
the name of peace it is justified. There are states that are satisfied with the current 
situation and the balance of power, there are others that may aim for the current 
situation’s overthrow and there are others that have as their goal to overpower 
everyone else and lead the way. How can we be sure that the US in its history of 
interventions in other states had moral cause like the restore of democracy or the 
overturn of dangerous regimes or everything was an expression of their aggressive 
foreign policy focusing on the US interests? We cannot be sure and we cannot prove 
anything however we can research on the facts of interventions and have some 
secure inferences regarding the process and at what extend the US foreign policies 
were successful.  If we want to try to find the causal mechanisms that led to all the 
American interventions in modern history we should try to deepen in the branches of 
realism’s theoretical framework. Below it is depicted my try to cross out two of the 
three most prevailing realist approaches in order to choose the most suitable one. 
  
Classic Realism 
  
It was after the end of WWII that the theory of classic realism was set to be 
the dominant theory in international relations even though its roots go back to 
Thucydides and later on to Machiavelli and Hobbes. According to K. Waltz the theory 
of classic realism is useful enough to give us answers in significant questions related 
to the survival of a state within an international system of anarchy as well as the 
causalities of states’ behaviors and even the shape of the international system itself. 
Although it is such a stable theory for so many centuries there is some criticism 
regarding the theory’s adaptability in the modern developments but there are four 
main attributes that hold classic realism at such a dominant position. 
1.    International relations are defined by anarchy in the sense that there is 
no central authority to control all the other states and of course block 
any potential military intervention. 
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2.    Since the Westphalian Treaty in .1648 there has not been any change 
regarding the main actors in the international system, they are the 
nation states themselves. 
3.    Being the main actors in this system makes them executive actors too, 
acting in a rational choice framework aiming to the maximization of 
their own powers. 
4.    With the absence of a central authority the only way to achieve order 
and stability is the balance of power. 
         Taking into consideration those four elements we can see that every 
state’s main purpose is to achieve their national interest that is their own security 
even if this means that a state may throw itself to a situation of military violence. This 
option can be considered as a legitimate foreign policy but we will have to separate 
any moral question as this is a state level and not individual. Moreover, we can 
observe from the historical facts that the international organizations do not play any 
significant role as they are totally interconnected with the way that states work 
making them almost invisible in the classic realist approach. 
         In general, and even in particular in the US case, foreign policy is more 
important than the state’s internal affairs as it is inextricably related to the state’s 
behavior towards the other states, a fact that sub-relates the state’s foreign policy 
with its own security and by extension its own survival. Regarding the foreign policy it 
is very significant the role that the public opinion plays as it is not always in the 
state’s interest tending to lack of rational mechanisms, a fact that may cause serious 
obstacles in a state’s foreign policy. This mirrors perfectly the ever developing use of 
the Special Forces throughout the years as a way for the US to express their foreign 
policy. 
         As long as the ultimate national interest is concerned, that is the state’s 
security, it can be achieved using power and this is the main reason that the states 
are in constant pursuit of power no matter the cost. In classic realist approach the 
international law and the international institutions of cooperation tend to have an 
indifferent significance as everything is under the control of the most powerful state-s 
however that does not mean that the powerful states can act openly as this would 
cause an international outcry. This may explain why Special Forces are described as 
a tool of precision as they can balance between the cruel reality of the demanding 
foreign policy and the sensitivity of public opinion. 
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         As stated above, states act rationally meaning that in case they go to 
war there is almost no way that this is a decision mistakenly taken but an action to 
serve the state’s political causes and interests. According to the classic realist theory 
the human nature is a significant element. Humans tend to act selfish and based on 
their instincts craving for more and more power no matter what. If we think of it 
inductively this can explain the selfish and power-seeking behaviors of states as the 
states are made by their own people. 
         In general we can say that the classic realism is a theoretical 
framework that can work for the US case and their interventions in other states 
however it cannot cover entirely the whole spectrum of the American foreign policy 
especially when it comes to the more recent cases which the paper focus on (Iraq 
and Afghanistan), it mostly works as a very solid basis for a realism’s branch that 
may be more suitable. 
  
         Structural Realism 
  
         Structural realism is in fact an extension of neorealism and the views of 
K. Waltz, that the international system itself influences the states causing them to 
seek more and more power and assert themselves over the other states. According 
to structural realism, states cannot act independently as every action that they may 
try to take is influenced by the structure of the international system. The two main 
supporters of structural realism are R.O. Keohane and B. Buzan. 
         We can say that the theoretical framework of structural realism is 
somewhat more suitable to the modern American foreign policy as it tries to throw off 
the stiffness of the bipolar international theory trying to explain the international 
system under its spheres of influence making clear that any kind of power cannot 
just transform to political power. States remain the main actors in the developments 
in the international system, leaving other actors like the international organizations to 
have insignificant roles, all of these happening in specific structure. According to B. 
Buzan, the principle of how the powers are allocated defines the structure of the 
international system as well as the ability of the actors to exercise their foreign 
policies. At the same time, the abilities of the actors define the structure of the 
international system too. We can see that there is circle among the states, their 
foreign policies and the international system. The one innovation that structural 
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realism adds to classic realism is that the researchers may have the ability to trace 
easier the moves of the actors. A second innovation is that according to structural 
realism the anarchy in the international system is not a solid situation but it can 
change shapes. So following this theory, every action that a state takes is directly 
connected to the structure of the international system. If we look up the American 
foreign policies we will see that as a country the US is pretty vocal in its actions, 
either in periods of relentless conflicts or of flourishing cooperation among the states. 
In such a theoretical framework where the international system can drift each state-
actor into a vicious circle of actions and reactions, we cannot see the US to fit in, 
even by using the totally cost effective Special Forces, it is not a theory that can 
describe the American tendency to overpower the other states and define thoroughly 
the international system. 
Both theories of classic realism and structural realism may fit in the US 
moderately successful foreign policy of older decades. 
  
  
Aggressive Realism 
  
  
The theory of aggressive realism focuses on the states’ enduring desire to 
maximize their power and achieve global dominance. This theory is based on three 
basic assumptions. 
1.    The behavior of the powerful states is shaped according to the structure of the 
international policies. Powerful states are supposed to have certain obligation 
in this international system and this leads them to have expansive foreign 
policies. Of course this expansive foreign policies make the weaker states feel 
less secure. This lack of security usually leads the weaker states to form 
alliances with stronger states or to have unpredictable behavior, for example 
favoring fanaticism or terrorism. 
2.    What is very important for the theory of aggressive realism is the definition of 
a truly powerful state. It takes more than a strong economy or a strong military 
force to define a state as a “great power” in the international system. A very 
strong and cohesive state mechanism is needed to control the economy and 
the army. The true force of a state is not projected only in the actions of the 
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state but it is more than necessary that its people accepts and agrees with the 
state’s foreign policy. This homogeneity of public opinion is maybe the most 
important part of a successful foreign policy. 
3.    The emergence of new powers, whether they can last or not, is a usual 
phenomenon however it is not a condition that can lead to conflicts. This is 
due to the fact that these new powers do not have the same obligations in the 
international system as the already established powerful states do. They may 
be less strong or in a bad or mediocre financial situation. They may be in a 
transitional level for a long time or their transition is happening under 
observation so there is no reason for conflict. 
The main representative of the aggressive realism theory is John J. 
Mearsheimer who, as his central idea, supports that the powerful states will not ever 
have as their aim to preserve their current status quo and be satisfied with what they 
have accomplished in the international system so far. According to John J. 
Mearsheimer it is the very international system that cultivates those chances and 
incentives for the great powers to forcefully impose themselves over other states and 
this is a temptation that the powerful states cannot resist as they substantially seek 
to be the international system’s hegemons. If a state achieves the total power then 
this means that it has total security, so we can see that Mearsheimer relates the total 
power with total security with first being a prerequisite for the second and vice versa. 
This kind of behavior that states have is a result of the anarchy and 
competitiveness that rule the international system as there is no central authority to 
put all the states under a strict control regarding their actions. As Mearsheimer says, 
combining this lack and the fact that the states have military forces it leads the states 
to constant insecurity, lack of trust, suspiciousness and nervous reactions, ending up 
to an endless try to impose themselves over the others. 
Now the theory of aggressive realism is the theory that almost totally depicts 
the foreign policy of the US of the last fifty years. If we study its foreign policy history 
we will see a non-satisfied state with its status quo, we will see a state with a 
constant desire to maximize its powers in order to doubtless institute itself as the 
greatest power in the world.  The US did not keep a moderate stance in the 
international system, in contrast, they used any military, financial or diplomatic 
means to rule the international system, never letting a chance slip to cause insecurity 
to the rest rival powers. 
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Of course this is a never ending process since the possibility of a state to 
become a ruler of this planet is almost zero, there will never exist a state with 
enough forces to rule all the grounds and all the oceans of this earth. However, if the 
closest to a global ruler is being a global influencer this is a sufficient reason for the 
US not to stop trying as only through this process they will feel a certain security. It is 
a fact that they learn from their past and they try to use their accumulated experience 
and technology in their foreign policy favor, with the US Special Forces being a 
significant part of this process. This theory also explains the American tendency to 
have a very vocal foreign policy in the greater Middle East area as it is a vital matter 
to have a strong presence in the soft underbelly of Russia and China, their main 
rivals in this endless procedure of defining the international system. 
 
Methodology 
The methodology I used to come up with the above inferences and the 
completion of the research was the method of process tracing. I decided to use this 
method as I had to deal with actual events and if we consider that process tracing is 
an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces 
of evidence— often understood as part of a temporal sequence of events or 
phenomena then in my mind was the most suitable tool of qualitative research. 
Given the close engagement with cases and the centrality of fine-grained case 
knowledge, process tracing can make decisive contributions to diverse research 
objectives, including: (a) identifying novel political and social phenomena and 
systematically describing them; (b) evaluating prior explanatory hypotheses, 
discovering new hypotheses, and assessing these new causal claims; (c) gaining 
insight into causal mechanisms (J.S. Mill, 1974). I took a factual approach on the 
matter so in fact even if I had to balance myself between process tracing and 
historical explanation at the beginning I found that using a macro-correlation for the 
theoretical approach and a micro-correlation for the factual approach would be the 
perfect path for me to stay within the process tracing method. 
  
 
The above drawing shows th
inference. First of all, I used the macro
rationale of the American foreign policy, why they would use the Special Forces as a 
tool of expression and how it can be consider
had to deeply get into foreign policy theories and their sub
which is the more suitable for the US foreign policy. As it is already analyzed above, 
the aggressive realism is the theory that allow
American foreign policy and what triggers the use of their Special Forces. However, 
to reach to the final inference I had to use a micro
and comprehend all the intermediate steps before the
causal mechanisms that constitute the exogenous intervening variables 
a vice versa relation- evaluating how successful can be characterized the American 
foreign policy. 
Another element that came up during the micro
existence of two smaller case studies. One being the debate of Special Forces vs 
Conventional forces as a tool of foreign policy and the second being a comparison
among Afghanistan, Iraq and the
Forces so I could better understand how a foreign policy expression is being 
considered as a success of failure. I would say that it was a tiring procedure to have 
smaller case studies within the main one but at the same time it was very in
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-correlation process was the 
 older American interventions usin
-that can be 
 
g their Special 
sightful. 
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Finally, I used another process tracing tool to help me to a more solid 
outcome and that is the deduction vs. induction rationale approach. In foreign policy 
and especially in the American one which represents a very powerful state in the 
international system there shouldn’t be room for inductive conclusions. Just because 
a foreign policy doctrine was successful in one case it does not mean that it can be 
applied in any other case. That was the main mistake the US did before the 
Afghanistan and Iraq cases and while they were showing their powerful foreign 
policy it was not cost effective and it came with a cost in public opinion too. Learning 
from their mistakes they adopted a deductive approach facing individually every case 
after the Afghanistan and Iraq events. This deductive logic helped me to evaluate the 
Afghanistan and Iraq cases as I compared the previous cases as individual ones and 
not as whole to reach to a more objective inference. 
In the last paragraph I wanted to include a few difficulties that I faced during 
my research. First of all, the bibliography is based on actual books, the internet was 
not as useful as I thought it would be, for example what Google shows first is many 
biased blogs or if not biased at least not focusing on the recounting of the events. So 
technology was not a very helping friend for my research. Another problem was that 
the success is not substantially measurable in my case. We cannot say that the 
American foreign policy expressed by the Special Forces was, for example, 34. The 
results of the research may imply subjectivity, the good thing however is that the 
whole procedure is very informative. As a difficulty for my research I would include 
the fact that the whole conceptualization can really drift you from your main focus 
and lead you, at best case, in more general and philosophical questions and at the 
worst case in wondering about conspiracy theories. That can be pretty tiring and of 
course time consuming. Finally, another difficulty was that the macro-correlation 
process was very theoretical and time consuming however it was very explanatory 
and insightful and the micro-correlation process got way too much in strategy and 
tactics which may be something good and different however it requires already 
existing knowledge regarding this approach. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
         It was already 1945 and the World War II was getting to its end due to 
the total preponderance of the Allies at all fronts. The American army had 
disembarked on the Philippines’ shores, which were under the Japanese rule, and 
started the country’s liberation through ferocious battles. The American prisoners of 
war were held under hideous conditions at various prison camps. The Japanese 
were willing not to allow the opposite forces to liberate their prisoners. They used to 
execute them by burning them alive with petrol and fire. 
In one of those camps, in the town of Cabanatuan there were five hundred 
American prisoners of war. A small force of 133 Rangers of the American army, with 
the support of some Filipino guerrillas, infiltrated behind the enemy lines and 
surrounded the prison camp, taking positions and waiting for the night to come. 
With the help of the diversion which was created by an American plane, the 
Rangers took by surprise the Japanese soldiers who were guarding the camp and 
the rest of the area, killed some hundreds of them and liberated 552 prisoners of 
war, leaving behind only two dead of their fellow soldiers. This was an outstandingly 
successful operation of the Special Forces (Haskew, 2007) 
1980. Iran. After the Islamic Revolution and the overthrown of the pro-
Western government of Shah, an Islamic group invaded in the American Embassy in 
Tehran, taking 52 diplomats as hostages.  The answer of the American government 
was the plan of an operation named Eagle Claw.  A group of specially trained Delta 
Force commandos of the American army would take over the mission to infiltrate 
with helicopters in the Iranian capital, in order to liberate the hostages and transport 
16 
 
them in safety with the same helicopters on the boats which were waiting for them in 
the Persian Gulf. 
 However this operation had a series of organizational difficulties and technical 
problems.  3 out of the 8 helicopters that were used for the infiltration of the Delta 
team had damages and were abandoned in the intermediate to station in the desert.  
The operation was called off and while the American forces were prepared to leave, 
a helicopter crashed with a transport plane. The collision had as a result the 
destruction of the two aircrafts and the death of eight people. The operation “Eagle 
Claw” was a painful and defamatory failure, but at least it could be used as a spark 
for a chain of changes and regulations that strengthened the effectiveness of the 
American Special Operation Forces since then, as it will be shown below (Haney, 
2005). 
 
 Those two short examples, of an extraordinarily successful and one totally 
failed special operation, can show the nature of the Special Forces’ missions, as well 
as the minimum margin between success and failure, a fact that shows the huge 
meaning that the appropriate training, organization and tactics have in using those 
military forces (McRaven, 1996). The Special Forces are substantially a surgical tool, 
a lancet the right use of which may be critical whereas its wrong use can create a 
huge problem (Robinson, 2012). 
 This paper will examine at what extend the American Special Forces 
expressed the American Foreign Policy during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in 
order to analyze the effects and examine if, in sum, the use of those Forces was 
successful or a failure. 
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 However, in order for this main question to be answered, an extended 
description and analysis of the Special Forces’ abilities, aims and role will be 
needed. First off, the Special Forces’ history and evolution will show how those 
Forces were shaped, which needs were planned to cover and what kind of 
operations they went through, a fact that highlights their differences contrasting them 
with the conventional military forces and their roles in the combat fields. 
 Therefore, the first chapter will give the definition of the Special Forces, it will 
explain the differences with the conventional army forces and it will present the 
structure of the American Special Forces. The second chapter will present a 
significant chronology regarding the role and the evolution of the American Special 
Forces, their role in various warfare from the Vietnam War and on, just before the 
most recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This recursion will enable the 
understanding of the framework, the role and the operational dogma of the Special 
Forces before the two main case studies that will be studied later on. 
 The main part of the paper will begin in the third chapter, where the Special 
Forces’ engagement in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq will be 
analyzed. Later on, in the fourth chapter, it will be described the role of the Generals 
Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus in the reorganization of the Special Forces 
utilization in the theaters of war, emphasizing on the applications that those new 
ideas of the two Generals had in the two case studies that this paper focuses on. 
 Thanks to the presentation of this data in these two chapters it will be possible 
to examine and evaluate the results of using the Special Forces in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The comparative contrast of the results will allow an outcome of conclusion and 
answer if in the end the use of those forces was a success or a failure. 
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Chapter II: Defining the Special Forces and their differences with conventional 
forces. 
  
 I.  Defining the Special Forces. 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are those military forces who have been 
trained in such a way so they could execute non-conventional operations (special 
missions) that the conventional forces of the army are not able to take over (Bowyer, 
1999). Some of the usual special missions are: recognition and surveillance of 
enemies’ territories, counter terrorism missions, operations of insurgents’ repression 
cooperating with the local population, sabotage and explosion of enemy targets, 
saving hostages, asymmetric war and training of friendly states’ army forces 
(Bowyer, 1999) 
 Special Forces are small and specifically trained units, manned by carefully 
chosen soldiers who use modified or special equipment and are trained in non-
conventional application of tactics against strategic and operational targets (Spulak, 
2007). Moreover, the successful fulfillment of those special missions depends on the 
capabilities of the individuals themselves, applied in such a flexible manner, with 
innovation and improvisation against their enemies that are most of the times 
unprepared and unable to react. The current approach is that the unique skills of the 
Special Forces are perfectly complementing the potential of the conventional military 
forces (Robinson, 2012). 
However, the definition of the Special Forces and their role is not just a simple 
case. First of all, which are those unique abilities of the Special Forces? This is not 
so clear in general bibliography since they are not referred in a specific way (Spulak, 
2007). In addition, why the Special Forces are supposed to just complement the 
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conventional forces and not have their own role in a state’s foreign policy? Besides, 
the notable characteristics of the 21st century’s conflicts give a particular strategic 
dimension to the Special Forces (Spearin, 2006) 
As long as the special forces themselves are concerned, they can be defined 
as non-conventional actions, against the points where the enemy is fragile in an 
organized and systematic military campaign, which are executed by Special units in 
order to facilitate the conventional operations and/or resolve political or military 
problems at an operational or strategic level which are difficult or impossible to be 
resolved only by using conventional forces (Kiras, 2004) 
Albeit, the problem even of the above careful an analytical definition of 
Special Forces do that defines the special forces through exclusion. Defining the 
Special Forces as non-conventional substantially we define them only in relation or 
in contrast to what is conventional. The difference between the Special Forces and 
the conventional forces will be further analyzed below. However the above definition 
shows that the special operations, and in extension the Special Forces that execute 
them, cannot be defined in the framework of stable missions capabilities for 
potentials (Spulak, 2007) 
In practice the special operations are better defined separately within each 
conflict. In the time of war, stand the men who have the personal capability to 
overcome the danger and possess the abilities that allow them to organize 
themselves in small and special units and strategically execute significant missions 
which cannot be executed by conventional units. Besides, historically, at least before 
the change of the strategic framework during the 21st century, the usual practice 
was the abolition or the restriction of the special forces units during time of peace, as 
the need to overcome the restrictions of the conventional forces is not apparent if 
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conventional operation do not exist in order to show those restrictions (Marquis, 
1997). 
Moreover, within the complex and unpredictable environment of a conflict, 
with the critical characteristic of the Special Forces units being their contribution in 
the framework of modern and conventional abilities, in order to achieve the ulterior 
strategic purpose. The general purpose of a large number of Special Forces units 
which act in order to achieve a common aim along the conventional units is the wear 
of the most important material and human resources of the enemy (Kiras, 2004). 
 
 
II. Focusing on the American Special Forces: Which are their differences 
with the conventional forces?  
Focusing on the way that the Special Forces work, complement or replace the 
conventional forces we can start noticing their differences. First of all, it is not always 
so clear to differentiate the two military bodies and the demarcation may be 
changing. As the abilities of the conventional forces are in constant development 
they acquire the potential to execute missions that in the past only the Special 
Forces could take over. (Spulak, 2007). 
For example, using night vision equipment was once a privilege that only the 
Special Forces had. In fact, around the 1980s even the Special Forces had a 
restricted access to night vision equipment (something that maybe played a role in 
the failure of Eagle Claw mission that was mentioned in the introduction), Today, 
though, that equipment’s usage is something taken for granted for the conventional 
forces too. That means that the time period when the night battles were a unique 
ability of the Special Forces is over, however the Special Forces still have the 
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advantage over the conventional forces in this kind of battle due to their superior 
training. (Spulak 2007). 
In any case, the conventional forces’ personnel covers a wider range of 
activities in contrast to the special operations’ personnel who have a smaller range of 
activities but far better abilities within this range. So we can say that a difference for 
sure is their level of training and specialization (Spulak, 2007). If at some point the 
distinction among the two forces stops being apparent, then the reason usually is the 
Special Forces are left behind concerning an adoption of a possible new technology, 
tactics or “military craftiness” that could give them the advantage against the 
conventional forces or in a different case those new technologies are now spread 
even in the conventional forces as happened in the example, mentioned above, of 
the night vision equipment (Marquis, 1997). 
In other words, the critical difference among the two military forces, the 
characteristic that distinguishes the Special Forces, is not the missions but the 
personnel. However, this does not simply mean that the special operations forces 
are defined by their human resources because that would be a circular argument 
recycling itself and being a useless definition. (Spulak, 2007). The existence of 
strategic targets which are beyond the abilities of the conventional forces creates the 
need for the Special Forces to overcome any restriction in their definition in order to 
achieve those targets (Sepp, 2005) 
Nevertheless, the nature of those missions that are defined as special or are 
assigned to the Special Forces do not define what are the Special Forces, even 
though there is a specific range of mission which are assigned to the Special Forces. 
Ultimately, the missions may change as the time passes but will define the Special 
Forces is their ability to overcome the restrictions that the conventional forces may 
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face. If the moment when the conventional forces will be capable to accomplish such 
missions comes, then the special operations forces should move on and focus on 
even more specialized and elite missions that would still remain out of the 
conventional forces’ ability range (Spulak 2007). 
Another main difference between the two military bodies concerns the 
conditions of their use. Especially after the evolution of the international framework of 
warfare from the end of the 20th century and on, the chances of using the 
conventional forces are more and more restrained. Specifically in conditions where 
the use of the conventional forces is not appropriate or intentional due to political or 
financial limitations, the use of the special operations forces can be intentional and 
give a series of advantages like: rising the moral of the local population, displaying 
military power in order to prevent escalation, the humiliation of the enemy, 
reassuring the public opinion within the state and preserving the stability in areas of 
high strategic importance (Spearin, 2006). 
In the USA’s case, the special operations forces are consisting of a great 
variety of carefully chosen and hard trained units coming from all the four branches 
of the American military, each having different history and abilities. The kind of those 
units and their roles will be covered below in order to answer what the Special 
Forces exactly are. 
In any case, there are two important features of the international political 
environment which make it clear that the demand of the Special Forces and the kind 
of missions that they take over will be high for the USA, first the downsizing of the 
military budget and second the continuous prevalence of the asymmetric threats. On 
the one hand, the USA face ongoing financial cuts regarding the military expenditure 
and the downsize of their huge budget is a challenge. Under Obama’s administration 
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the priority of the American Foreign Policy was given to counter-terrorism operations 
and to the use of innovative approaches of lower cost and smaller scale in order to 
achieve national security aims (Robinson, 2013). 
One of the most financially effective parts of the American defensive arsenal, 
cost/effectiveness relation, is the Special Forces. They consist of small, mature and 
extremely capable personnel who can act unilaterally or in cooperation with foreign 
allies. The budget of the American Special Forces for the year 2012 was 10,5bn 
dollars. The amount may sound huge but it is only the 1.4% of the total defense 
budget (Robinson, 2013). 
Even if we add the cost of the supportive personnel of the conventional forces 
who take part in the special operations and the cost of the equipment, the total 
amount again goes to 4% of the total Defense budget. This percentage is rather 
small if we take into consideration the contribution that the Special Forces have to 
the national security. This explains the reason for which this percentage was in fact 
quadrupled from 2001 to 2012. This cost effectiveness of the Special Forces is a 
huge advantage against the conventional forces who just absorb significant amounts 
of money  while their usefulness is reduced due to the two characteristics of the 
international political environment of the 21st century mentioned above (Robinson, 
2012) 
That is the second characteristic which explains the high demand of the 
special operations forces. As mentioned already, the asymmetric threats are 
constantly rising for the American security, in contrast to the conventional threats, 
and the Special Forces are the appropriate weapon for the confrontation of these 
threats. These threats may come from sovereign states but also from organizations 
outside from the state framework like terrorist groups, guerrillas or international 
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criminal networks which are keep getting stronger from the developing technology 
and other characteristics of the globalization (Robinson, 2012). 
Even though the main body of Al-Qaeda, the main threat for the security of 
the USA, is now dissolved other subsidiary organizations have emerged and 
expanded in other unstable or with no government states of Middle East and Africa 
which may be blighted by internal conflicts. That kind of enemies can use non-
conventional tactics in order to counterbalance the total superiority of the USA and 
their allies’ conventional forces. So, the non-conventional forces and the non-
conventional missions are becoming the appropriate way to neutralize these threats, 
a fact which offers another advantage to the Special Forces opposite the 
conventional forces (Robinson, 2012). 
In order to consolidate all the above and to define more carefully which are 
the Special Forces in the American case, below it is described the current status and 
structure of the American Special Forces, their role and their missions. As it will be 
shown in the next chapter, the current structural operation of the American Special 
Forces is a product of a procedure of constant amelioration and development of 
some previous negative operational outcomes in the battlefield that ultimately led to 
useful deductions. (Robinson, 2013) 
In this way, the resounding failure of the operation Eagle Claw in 1980, for the 
saving of the American hostages in the American embassy in Iran, was the spark of 
deep research which showed the lack of proper commanding structure and control 
and of course the absence of cooperation among the military branches as the main 
reason of the failure. As a result, the American Congress legislated the 
establishment of an interdisciplinary management to coordinate and carry out all 
special operations (Marquis, 1997) 
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The United States Special Operations Command or in short USSOCOM or 
SOCOM was founded in 1987 as a unified battle management, belonging to the 
Ministry of Defense and coordinating the actions of the individual administrations of 
the four branches of the American military forces, the army, the navy, the air force 
and the marines. The SOCOM has coordinated all the significant operations of the 
American Special Forces since the intervention in Panama in 1989 up to the war 
against terrorism that is still going on and included the operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq which will be examined further later on in this paper (Dailey & Webb, 2006). 
The SOCOM coordinates and executes a wide range of secret and sensitive 
missions which may include the execution of small scale attacking missions and 
surgical hits in the enemy’s area, recognition, counter terrorism operations, 
psychological war, nonconventional hits, peacekeeping missions and/or war on 
drugs. Each branch of the Special Forces has its own administration and this will be 
shown below. However, when two or more branches need to cooperate the SOCOM 
takes over the administration of the operation and the coordination of each 
administration together (Dailey & Webb, 2006). 
The Joint Special Operations Command, in short JSOC, belongs also to the 
SOCOM and it is the technical part which has as its assignment to study the 
demands and the techniques of the special operations in order to secure the sound 
cooperation among the different branches, the compatibility of their equipment, to 
plan and execute exercises and training programs and finally to develop new tactics 
for the Special Forces (Marquis, 1997). 
The JSOC trains also the commanders and the personnel of the conventional 
forces, organizes international exercises and improve the operational and strategic 
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readiness of the available forces. This administration coordinates the actions of the 
four branches which are described exactly below: 
The American army has the United States Army Special Operations 
Command (USASOC) which was created in 1989. The American Special Forces are 
the spearhead of the American army in the special operations from the World War II 
era. The USASOC commands an array of special units of special operations like the 
famous “Green Berets” or the equally famous “Rangers”. The importance of these 
units grows as the conventional collisions become more and more rare and the non-
conventional conflicts more and more usual (Finlan, 2009). Below we can see the 
most significant units of the Special Forces along with their roles and abilities. 
The two most famous Special Forces’ units of the American army are the 75th 
regiment of Rangers (mostly known as Army Rangers) and the Green Berets. The 
Rangers are a flexible group of soldiers who can develop rapidly as each of their 
regiments can be transported anywhere in the world only within 18 hours. They have 
heavy equipment and they are able to execute conventional and non-conventional 
missions. They can infiltrate their target from land, sea or air kai they are specialized 
in direct hits, raids or attacks in buildings or airports (Dailey & Webb, 2006). 
The Green Berets are an extremely agile force taking over operations of any 
kind in war time or even in peace periods. In the second case, their main mission is 
the protection of friendly regimes and the training of their military or police personnel, 
serving as consultants. In war time, the Green Berets are specialized in non-
conventional operations behind the enemy lines. Apart from that they take part in a 
wide range of other supporting duties that may include peacekeeping missions, 
missions of search and rescue, human aid supplies, neutralizing mines and 
operations against drug trafficking (Moore, 2002). 
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Except for these two well-known units, under the USASOC umbrella, there 
are many other important supporting units. The 160th Special Regiment of Air Force 
which offers support from the air for the infiltrations, supply and deployment of the 
Special Forces units using light or heavy helicopters. The 4th and the 8th Supporting 
Team of Military Intelligence are specialized in the operations of psychological war. 
The 95th Brigade of Political Affairs supports the local population in cases of war or 
natural disasters. The Brigade of Maintenance of Special Forces has duties 
concerning the transmissions and supplies of the rest of the Special Forces. (Daily & 
Webb, 2006). 
The American navy has their own administration of Special Forces, the United 
States Naval Special Warfare Command, in short NAVSOC, which was constituted 
in 1987. The NAVSOC offers leadership and guidance to their Special Forces unit. 
Their units, like the famous Navy Seals, are organized, equipped and trained with 
their aim being the execution of a spectrum of special operations which among 
others may include direct hits, area recognition, counter terrorism operations, 
supporting friendly regimes, non-conventional battles and psychological war. The 
Navy Special forces execute missions all over the world in cooperation with 
conventional and non-conventional forces from all the military branches (Couch, 
2006). The Navy SEALs (a name which derives from Sea Air Land teams) are one of 
the most reliable, skilled and disciplined units all over the world. Their special 
characteristic is their naval operations as they strike from the sea and they return to 
the sea. The SEALs are specialized in direct strikes and special recognition 
missions. Their abilities in moving unnoticed enable them to execute many missions 
against targets that larger forces would not be able to approach (Couch, 2006). 
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The SEALs also act in more specialized units, like the Naval Special Warfare 
Development Group, which constitutes a specialized force with duties concerning 
counter terrorism, the SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams that use individual underwater 
vehicles for more effective secret infiltration. The Navy also possesses the Special 
Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen, who take care for the SEALs infiltration to a 
target as well as their extraction from it using speedboats suitable for shallow waters 
(Couch, 2006). 
The American Air Force possesses their own unit of special operation forces 
and in this case is named Air Force Special Operations Command or simply AFSOC, 
created in 1990 and it commands and coordinates the existing units of special 
operations and the cooperation among the rest of the Special Forces and the 
conventional forces of the USA. The Air Force Special Forces are consisted of 
extensively trained pilots and ground personnel that can be deployed fast wherever it 
is needed. The Special Forces of the Air Force have mostly a supporting role and 
have a specialization in focusing on airstrikes with precision, infiltrating from the air 
and supplying the operational units with gas and equipment (Dailey & Webb, 2006). 
The Combat Controllers are ground forces who have as their aim to 
coordinate the aerial operation. They take care for the aerial traffic control, aerial 
supply, the coordination concerning the parachute falls and the general support with 
airstrikes. The Pararescuemen are specialized airborne rescue crew who take over 
conventional and non-conventional rescue operations regarding the air force 
personnel. Finally, the Special Operations Weather Technicians collect weather data 
for the better organization of the special operations (Finlan, 2009). 
Finally, the Marine Corps has its own administration, the United States Marine 
Corps Forces Special Operations Command, in short MARSOC, which was founded 
29 
 
in 2005. The initial plan was for the Marine Corps to constitute a unit of almost 2500 
men and operate as a part of USSOCOM. The MARSOC had in the beginning a 
small number of administrating personnel that was called Foreign Military Training 
Unit and had as a purpose the protection of friendly regimes from internal overthrown 
and the training of the regimes’ military forces. But the size and the roles of 
MARSOC were gradually enlarged (Dailey & Webb, 2006). 
As a part of USSOCOM, the MARSOC aims to train, organize, equip and 
develop the Marine forces of special operations wherever is needed all over the 
world. The MARSOC forces were operationally developed in 2006 and its 
administration reached its full operational mode in October of 2008. The forces 
contribute to the security of friendly states, the direct strikes and the collection of 
intelligence (Finlan, 2009). 
The Marine Special Operations Regiment wider known as Raiders, consisting 
of three battalions of special operations and a unit of administration. Their main 
target is the adapted training of friendly regimes in order to develop their tactical 
abilities. What is more, the Raiders are capable to take part in every common 
mission of special operation with other Special Forces units if needed, under the 
umbrella of SOCOM. The Raiders are supported by a battalion of intelligence. 
The above recursion presented the shape, the role and the nature of the 
Special Forces of the USA, as long as the special operations’ structure. The next 
chapters will show all of them in practice as they will describe the actions of those 
forces in a framework of significant conflicts. 
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Chapter III: The American Special Forces before the Afghanistan and 
Iraq wars: From Vietnam to Mogadishu 
 
I. The evolution of the Special Forces 
 As it will be shown below, the roots of the special operations forces can be 
found back in ancient times when some already existing forces could be 
characterized as the ancestors of the modern Special Forces. However, the current 
structure of the Special Forces started to shape after the second half of the 20th 
century and especially in the 21st century (Moreman, 2006). 
 Their significance raised a lot due to the diplomacy of sensitivity that makes 
the deployment of conventional forces more difficult and the fact that it would be an 
easier way for the government to avoid political criticism and consequences if a 
small, anonymous and elite force fulfilled the initial target (Finlan, 2009). For 
example, in Kosovo as well as in Afghanistan the Special Forces were used in this 
way, in cooperation with friendly local insurgents and air forces. The ground forces 
engaged with the enemy forces making them to move and become the target of the 
total air force supremacy that the allies had (Smith, 2009). 
The Special Forces have played an important role throughout history, since 
the ancient times, when the mission was something different than the traditional kind 
of battles like the recognition of the enemy forces, the disruption of the enemy with 
rapid strikes leaving no time for reaction, or to sabotage the enemy (Bank, 1986) 
The Chinese General Jiang Ziya, in the 11th century BC, suggested in his 
strategic complete works the use of voluntaries with strong incentives for constituting 
an elite force with specialized strategic targets like the ensuring of hills or long 
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distance courses when the needs were again something different than the traditional 
warfare.  
The Carthaginian Hamilcar Barca, the father of the famous marshal Hannibal, used 
elite forces which could unleash a large number of strikes each day. The Romans 
and the Byzantines used small, fast and camouflaged ships for the recognition and 
sabotage raids like the modern commandos do (Moreman, 2006). In the same way, 
the Arabs had specialized elite forces for naval operations, using camouflaged ships 
for collecting intelligence and raids or they dressed themselves as crusaders in order 
to get on board in enemy ships and destroy them or get hostages (Bank, 1986) 
 One of the well-known forces that can be considered as a Special Forces 
progenitor was of course the Japanese ninja, who were mostly used by local lords as 
spies, trackers, assassins, bodyguards or sometimes they would fight along the 
conventional army. In Europe, during the Napoleonic Wars, started the creation and 
use of irregular forces who would take over more specialized missions as trackers or 
skirmishers without taking part in the main battles (Bowyer, 1999). 
 However, the history of the Special Forces with the modern meaning starts, in 
substance, in the World War II. The archetype of those forces was the British 
commandos. The commandos force was created in 1940 with its target being the 
execution of surprising raids and sabotage within the enemy ground. It started with 
the name “Special Service Brigade” and expanded very soon, unleashing a series of 
sabotage raids in the shores of the occupied Europe (Moreman, 2006). 
 As the war kept going on, the commandos force was growing reaching the 
number of 30 independent units (each having 450 men constituting a “commando”) 
and four brigades. The commandos were active in all the war fronts, from the Arctic 
to Europe, from the Mediterranean to the Middle East, also in Southeast Asia, the 
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Norwegian fjords, in Sahara Desert and in the jungles of Indochina. The kind of the 
missions that they would take over was from small scale sabotage missions 
executed by small group of men disembarked with boats or parachutes in the enemy 
soil, up to whole brigades who fought on the frontline of the Allies’ invasions in 
Europe and Asia (Moreman, 2006). 
 In addition, the commandos were the forerunners of all the other, modern 
Special Forces who are active today. The men who served the famous Special Air 
Service (SAS), as well as the Special Boat Service (SBS), were the basis of the 
respective forces of the other countries like the French navy commandos, the 
Belgian paratroopers, the Greek “Ieros Lochos”, even the American Rangers 
(Moreman, 2006). 
 In the USA, the history of the Special Forces begins with the Office of 
Strategic Services- OSS) which was the ancestor of the CIA and was responsible for 
the coordination of the Special Forces missions. As already mentioned,, the first of 
those forces was the Rangers, constituted in 1942 following the example of the 
British commandos. Respectively, in the same year it was created the special unit of 
the American marines that had as a target the execution of special operations, 
known as the Marine Raiders (Bank, 1986). 
 In the opponent camp, the Axis forces had themselves some special 
operations forces though it was in a smaller scale than the Allies and especially the 
British. However, those units managed to gain reputation and had some major 
success. The German unit of special operations was the Brandenburger regiment 
whose men became known as the Brandenburgers. This specific unit came under 
the German espionage (Abwehr) and was used for the execution of missions like the 
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infiltration behind the enemy lines and the long distance recognition in the invasions 
in Poland, France and Soviet Union from 1939 and on (Haskew, 2007). 
 However, the most successful German special operations were not executed 
by an elite unit but by some specialized units who were just used in special 
operations depending on the occasion. The most famous operations of this kind 
were the saving of the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini in 1943, from the hotel where 
he was kept captive in the Gran Sasso plateau, by men of the parachutist regiment 
“Lehr”, or the infiltration of the 502nd regiment of the SS behind the American lines in 
1944 aiming to the sabotage and disorientation of the enemy (Haskew, 2007). 
 The Italians, in contrast, they had specific military units for special operations 
that came under the air force or the navy and despite their adversities, they had 
some important success. The 10th Flotilla was consisting of frogmen commandos 
who managed to sink or cause serious damages to a large number of British ships in 
the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, the Air Force commandos executed many 
missions of sabotage against airports or railroads in the Allies’ grounds, destroying 
25 heavy American bombers only in one raid (Haskew, 2007). 
 Finally, the Japanese Imperial Army also used some small and flexible units 
of special operations. The majority of the missions was executed by paratroopers, 
who were used in order to keep the oil well of Sumatra intact during the invasion of 
the Dutch East Indies in 1942, and next in the sabotage of the Allies’ airports in 
Burma and Philippines (Haskew, 2007). 
 The above recursion showed the conditions under which the first Special 
Forces were created and fought during the World War II. Since then, the special 
operations forces have extensively evolved in terms of equipment, tactics and 
potentials in order to adapt themselves to the new needs or to cope more efficiently 
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with the current needs. The post war evolution of the American Special Forces will 
be shown below concerning the “useful experience” that the USA gained from their 
different conflict involvements from the Vietnam war and on. 
 
II. The Special Forces in the Vietnam War and the outcomes of the conflict. 
 
  The experience of the Vietnam War proved to be defining for the 
reconstruction of almost every branch of the American army forces as it was a new 
kind of warfare and a conflict that showed all the significant weaknesses at every 
level including equipment, strategic approach, communication policies, tactics etc. 
On the one hand, this war proved to be very important as the development of the 
outcome of a painful loss helped in the later evolution of the American forces and 
their abilities (Rosenau, 2001). 
 In example, in the beginning of the Vietnam War, in the American Air Force 
there was this view that the use of the aircrafts’ machine guns and the close-range 
air fights belonged to the past and the present belonged to the air-to-air missiles. 
However the lack of easy controlling of the missiles and the fact that they could not 
be used without seeing the enemy led to great losses of ultramodern aircrafts 
caused by the “ancient” Vietnamese ones (Rosenau, 2001). 
 Nevertheless, the US used the knowledge gained in the battle ground and 
cared to equip quickly all their aircrafts with machine guns, and in the long term to 
design all the next fighter aircrafts so to perform better in the air fights, moreover 
they established the academies of battle tactics like the notorious school Top Gun of 
the American Navy (Rosenau, 2001). In the same way, the Vietnam War offered 
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important lessons to the American Special Forces which were extensively used in 
the operation theater of the Southeast Asia. 
 All the Vietnam War period, and especially in the determinant years between 
1961 and 1965, was significant for the political use of the American Special Forces. 
During the first years of the war the dogma concerning the use of the special 
operations forces needed many and radical redefinitions, from an elite group of 
forces at the in WWII standards to a unit oriented to the development of non-
conventional war methods and tactics of suppressing a guerrilla war (Plaster, 1997). 
 The first involvement of the American Special Forces in Vietnam substantially 
happened in 1957, when soldiers of the 1st Team of Special Forces took over the 
training of 80 soldiers that belonged to the South Vietnam, in a special commandos’ 
training camp. In the same way, units of the American Special Forces were sent to 
settle in the neighboring country of Laos so to act as moving units who would train 
the army of the South Vietnam. Already since the end of 1950s, elite officers of the 
special operation forces of America had moved from the US to the stations in 
Okinawa to have an advisory role for the US allies. So, the first involvement of the 
Special Forces in the region had to do with small groups of soldiers who worked as 
consultants and trainers (Plaster, 1997). 
 However, as the American involvement in Vietnam escalated the same 
happened with the use of the Special Forces. Given that the special operations 
forces had the appropriate training to organize guerrilla operations, as they have 
already done during the WWII, it made sense that they could repress an enemy who 
used that same tactic. Following this mission, the American Special Forces served 
their purpose in cooperation with the respective South-Vietnamese forces against 
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the communist Vietcong insurgents, in operations like the deep infiltration so to 
liberate American war captives (Bank, 1986). 
 Being afraid of the rising asymmetric threat of the Vietcong insurgents, 
President Kennedy started to mobilize and transport more and more Special Forces 
units in Vietnam. The main special operation force of the US, in this specific war 
theater, was the 5th Team of Special Forces (airborne) which were constituted of 
Green Berets of the American army. The team started as small group of consultants 
in 1961, but with the escalation of the operations it had been transformed to a full 
force with branches of administration, Special Forces, transmissions and air carriers. 
This Special Forces team was used in mission of conventional and non-conventional 
war against the Vietcong, guarding the passages in the borders between the two 
Vietnams, watching on the routes that the communist soldiers used in the south and 
in general all the spectrum of special operations. The Green Berets was among the 
last American forces who left from South Vietnam. The unit returned in 1971, but 
some soldiers stayed individually as counselors until the collapse of the South 
Vietnam government in 1975 (Moore, 2002). 
 During the Vietnam War, the US had to face targets of great strategic 
importance that were difficult to strike for many reasons. A number of political 
restrictions made impossible the use of conventional ground forces in the North 
Vietnam and the American Air Force, despite its supremacy, could not hit those 
targets. To overcome this problem, the military leadership of the US, as in the case 
of the Gulf War later, used the Special Forces for the recognition and localization of 
those hidden targets (Rosenau, 2001). 
The Special Forces went through the neighboring state of Laos in order to search for 
areas where they could set a logistics camp and other strategic targets which were 
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hidden in the vast jungle. In the same way later, in the Gulf War, the Special Forces 
entered in Iraq to seek for camouflaged or moving missile platforms that the allies’ 
aircrafts could not recognize. In both cases, the morphology of the ground and the 
size of the area-target, in combination with the enemy countermeasures, made the 
Special Forces’ attempt to achieve the goal extremely difficult (Moore, 2002). 
 From this side, the special operations forces, in the Cho Chi Minh path, were 
not able to hit or diminish the ability of the North Vietnam to send military material to 
the insurgents who operated in the South. However, those operations were not 
unsuccessful. The Special Forces managed to critically annoy the military forces of 
the communist side, making them to use an important part of their army in the path’s 
defense which in another case would be used in the war against South Vietnam 
(Rosenau, 2001). 
 To continue the comparison with the posterior Gulf War, in that case, even 
though the Special Forces did not have a particular success in locating and 
destroying the Scud missiles, their attempt strategically succeeded in reassure and 
avert Israel from joining the war against Iraq, something that could possibly destroy 
the sensitive alliance of the Arab states against Saddam Hussein (Rosenau, 2001). 
 The operations of the Special Forces in the path of Cho Chi Minh offered a 
series of good lessons concerning the evolution of the special operations forces. 
They showed the difficulties that an inhospitable ground may have for an extensive 
use of the Special Forces behind the enemy lines. Even if the evolution of 
technology may, with the use of drones in ground recognition and targets’ location, 
facilitate this kind of operations now, it cannot guarantee the successful use of 
Special Forces. In fact, the blow that possible death or captivity of the soldiers may 
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cause to the public opinion, makes the use of the Special Forces incumbent only in 
cases that the potential benefits can justify the risk (Rosenau, 2001) 
 Nevertheless, the Special Forces can play a significant role in tracking down 
and destroying enemy targets through the installation of ground sensors for the 
targets’ monitoring, or the executions of recognition operation  for the confirmation of 
the targets’ destruction caused by the air force. Finally, the Special Forces can be 
used in neutralizing weapons of mass destruction, a mission that is dangerous and 
almost impossible to be achieved only with the use of airstrikes (Rosenau, 2001).  
 
III. The Special Forces protecting the international naval treaty during the Iran-
Iraq war. 
 Iran has always been one of the closest American allies after the WWII and of 
course had an important strategic meaning in the containment policy against the 
Soviet Union. However, with the fall of Shah’s government and the Islamic 
Revolution, Iran turned itself to one of the biggest dangers for the US. The American 
diplomat hostages in the embassy in Tehran and the badly designed operation for 
saving them, described in the introduction, was a huge blow in the American prestige 
and a motive for the reconsideration of the Special Forces’ organization (Priest & 
Arkin, 2011). 
 The problematic structure in the administration and control of the Special 
Forces led to the abolition of the then officers in charge. The first tactical operation 
that the new administration took over was the operation “Earnest Will” in 1987, in 
which Special Forces from both the Navy and Army took part. The operation’s aim 
was the protection of the neutral oil tankers and other commercial ships which 
travelled through the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. The Iranian attacks to 
39 
 
Kuwaiti tankers made Kuwait to ask for the protection of 11 of its ships, which were 
authorized under the American flag so they would be protected by the American 
Navy (Geraghty, 2001). 
 The American protection though did not deter the Iranian forces from 
continuing the attacks on the Kuwaiti tankers using mines and small vessels, leading 
the American Navy to ask the conjunction of the Special Forces. Using two self-
made floating platforms and helicopters of the US army, the Navy SEALs started to 
watching on the Iranian activities. On the 21st of September 1987, the American 
helicopters located an Iranian minelayer and drew fire against it forcing its crew to 
abandon it. The SEALs got on board and found the mines as well as the diary which 
proved that Iran has been putting mines in international waters (Geraghty, 2011). 
 Soon, the Special Forces understood the Iranian operations’ motif, who have 
been hiding their minelayers in oil platforms during the day and in the night they put 
their mines on the tankers. Helicopters of the American Special Forces surprised 
three Iranian minelayers while they were operating and sank them all (McRaven, 
1996). Few days later, Iranian forces stroke another Kuwaiti tanker with a missile. 
The reaction from the American side was the operation “Nimble Archer”, in the 
framework of which, the SEALs boarded on the platforms that the Iranian forces 
used and destroyed them all using explosives (McRaven, 1996). 
 In 1988, the American frigate Samuel B. Roberts suffered serious damages 
caused by an Iranian mine in international waters. Once more, the American reply 
was direct, and the operation Praying Mantis stroke back on an Iranian frigate and oil 
platforms used as Iranian bases. After those events, the Iranian attacks on neutral 
ships were radically reduced and stopped by the end of the Iran-Iraq War some 
months later (Southworth, 2009). 
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 During the Iran-Iraq War and the Iranian attacks on neutral ships, the 
American Special Forces helped with their specialized abilities the American Navy to 
gain control of the Persian Gulf and stop the Iranian small vessels and minelayers 
from reaching their targets. The main advantage of the Special Forces in that case 
was their ability in the night battles. The proper equipment and their training gave 
them a decisive advantage in those battles. Moreover, due to those operational 
needs, the American Special Forces got new weapon systems, the Special 
Operations Vessels Mark V, which have served them since then as permanent 
additions. (Southworth, 2009). 
 
IV. The Special Forces in the Peace Operations in Somalia 
The US involvement in Somalia started in 1992 in the general frame of the 
operation “Provide Relief”, an operation of the United Nations to provide human aid 
during the Somalian civil war. The first soldiers of the Special Forces who took part 
were doctors and stretcher bearers who accompanied the humanitarian aid 
shipments. In the Restore Hope operation that followed, also by the United Nations, 
aiming to the creation of a safe environment for providing humanitarian aid, men of 
the Special Forces along with CIA officers executed recognition missions before the 
conventional forces entered the operational theater (Smith, 2008). 
The first missions of the operation Restore Hope were executed by the Navy 
SEALs having to do with hydrographic recognition in order to find the most suitable 
locations for the Marines’ landing. The SEALs swam from their boats off the shores 
up to the port of Mogadishu so to find the best locations, to check for possible threats 
and confirm that the port could support unloading ships. It was a very difficult mission 
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as the SEALs swam against to a strong current and among the port’s waste (Smith, 
2008). 
Later on, the SEALs constituted the personal security for President Bush 
during his visit in Somalia. In 1992, more Special Forces units moved from Kenya to 
Somalia and took part in the operation Restore Hope. In 1993 the Joint Somalia 
Force was created and served as the coordinator of all the Special Forces acting on 
the area. Their mission was to contact, and if needed intervene, with the different 
ambivalent forces of the civil war for the facilitation of the humanitarian aid provision. 
A Special Forces echelon travelled for more than 40.000km to destroy weaponry and 
explosives used by the ambivalent forces (Tucker & Lamb, 2007). 
In August of 1993 a Special Forces team was created to answer to the attacks 
made by the forces of warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid to the US and UN forces. It 
was the operation Gothic Serpent, in which, American Marines, Rangers, Navy 
SEALs and Air Force Special Forces too part, aiming to arrest Aidid who had been 
hiding after the UN air forces raided his bunkers (Tucker & Lamb, 2007). 
Between August and September 1993, the joint force executed six missions in 
Mogadishu, and even though the Aidid’s arrest did not happen, the force succeeded 
in restricting his moves. The 7th mission aimed at the Aidid’s headquarters in Bakara 
market of Mogadishu hoping to arrest Aidid and his two commanders. The main 
attack was executed by helicopters of the army that carried Rangers, being 
supported by a motorcade of other Special Forces units (Tucker & Lamb, 2007). 
However, the mission faced a greater resistance and fire than the previous 
ones. Even so, the joint force managed to capture 24 Somalis including the Aidid’s 
commanders. But, as the Rangers were preparing the motorcade, an MH-60 Black 
Hawk helicopter was shot down by a rocket (Smith, 2008). 
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A small part of the joint force made a rescue group and along with two more 
helicopters rushed to the crash point to help. They found themselves into fierce 
battles as a second Black Hawk was shot down by a rocket launcher, close to the 
crash point of the first one, while a crowd of armed Somalis tried to attack to the 
survivors of the two crashed helicopters (Smith, 2008). The crowd managed to 
overpower the heroic resistance of the Rangers in the second crash point, killing 
them all except for the pilot who was captured as hostage. At the same time, the 
rescue group that was heading over the second crash point faced a furious 
resistance by the Somalis and they needed the fire support by another two 
helicopters in order to withdraw and return to their base (Southworth, 2009) 
The soldiers of the initial group headed on foot to the first crash point, facing 
also hard resistance by Somalis who were fortified in various buildings. The rescue 
force set a defensive perimeter and managed to extricate the first helicopter pilot’s 
body. The main motorcade, having boarded the Somalis captives, tried too to verge 
on the first crash point but accepted a barrage of gunfire and was forced to withdraw 
back to base having serious losses on men and vehicles (Southworth, 2009). 
The rescue force was rescued hours later by a strong force consisted of 
Rangers, SEALs and Malaysian and Pakistani soldiers of the UN force. The initial 
joint force returned to its base around dawn, completing the bloodiest battle in a 
populated area that the US forces have ever taken at least since the Vietnam War. 
The operation Gothic Serpent was a huge failure and Aidid was not captured 
(Southworth, 2009). 
The Special Forces of the US were withdrawn from Somalia, along with the 
rest of the UN forces, from 1994 to 1995. The deadly operation Gothic Serpent was 
a blow to the prestige of the US Special Forces and the events were depicted in the 
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movie “Black Hawk Down”. However, before that specific operation, the Special 
Forces had a significant contribution in the US and UN missions, executing 
recognition missions, helping the humanitarian aid provisions and protecting the rest 
of the forces, reassuring their safe passage and the protection of the ships that 
carried supplies (Tucker & Lamb, 2007). 
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Chapter IV: The Afghanistan and Iraq cases 
 
I. The US Special Forces in Afghanistan 
The fact that Afghanistan was chosen by Osama Bin Laden as the basis of his 
operations was not just a happenstance but it was due to a number of good reasons. 
The Saudi terrorist leader extensively knew the geography of the country as he had 
already fought on those territories during the 1980s, against the Soviet Union 
however that time as an ally of the USA. Consequently he knew that Afghanistan 
was one of the most fierce, isolated and hard to reach countries with destroyed 
roads by decades of warfare. Also, in that period of time that the US were preparing 
for the intervention Afghanistan had borders with states that were either hostile or 
precautious against the US and had the Taliban ruling the country, a government 
that was against every characteristic of the modern world that the US advocated. All 
the above elements made the revenge to the terrorist attack of the 9/11 a huge 
challenge for the American military forces (Bradley & Maurer, 2011). 
The truth was that the US had no previous operational experience in the 
Afghanistan territory with the only exception being some assaults with Cruise 
missiles against Taliban targets as retaliation against the terrorist attacks of the Al 
Qaeda in the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Having tactical 
army forces there, supporting them and supplying them in a war against the Taliban 
would be an extremely difficult task. In short, during the 9/11 aftermath, the US had 
almost no realistic military approach against Afghanistan but to destroy the whole 
country using nuclear weapons (Bradley & Maurer, 2011). 
The solution however was found by Cofer Black who was the head of the 
Counter Terrorism Center of the CIA and an officer of the Secret Services. Black and 
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his team had already been pursuing the Al Qaeda since 1999 and making some 
progress before 9/11 happened. They had a field team in Afghanistan making 
contact with General Massoud, who was the chief of the North Alliance and a rival of 
the Taliban regime, in order to obtain intelligence regarding Al Qaeda’s targets in 
Afghanistan. Unfortunately, General Massoud had been assassinated by a suicide 
bomber just two days before the 9/11 attack took place (Wright, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the Black’s plan was the team up of CIA agents, translators and 
Special Forces members of the USSOCOM in order to support and train the allied 
insurgents’ forces, like the North Alliance men, and to recognize and highlight the Al 
Qaeda targets to the American air force. During the weeks that followed the 9/11, the 
White House drafted the necessary plans for the Special Forces to become the tip of 
the spear in the general operations that would take place in the Afghanistan territory 
(Wright, 2010). 
As the American forces were gathering, the Special Forces were split in two 
operational groups, one for the Northern Afghanistan and one for the Southern, 
having support by the American Air Force as well as by the Special Forces of the 
allies like the UK and Australia. At the same time, the US sought to achieve the 
creation of military bases in neighboring countries like Pakistan and Uzbekistan so 
they could support their forces, supply them with ammunition and pharmaceutical 
materials and of course financially support the insurgents of North Alliance and other 
forces within Afghanistan that had already been fighting the Taliban regime (Neville, 
2012a). 
The plan was set to start on the 19th of October in 2001, only 39 days after 
the terrorist attacks in the US, when a Chinook helicopter deployed 14 men of the 
American Special Forces, who belonged to the American Air Force, in a 
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mountainous area of the northern Afghanistan. Respective groups infiltrated the 
Afghanistan territory in general in order to locate and evince Taliban targets which 
were camouflaged in an astonishing way so the American drones could not 
distinguish them. The rest of the American Special Forces followed like the Rangers, 
Green Berets and Navy SEALs who, in no time, contacted the North Alliance forces 
(King, 2014). 
The Special Forces teams operated along with the resistance groups against 
the Taliban inside Afghanistan. Their missions included the recognitions of enemy 
targets, direct strikes against them, operations of search and rescue, destruction of a 
large number of tunnels and caves in which Al Qaeda terrorists were hiding, 
arresting significant members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda and locating and 
destroying all the terrorists’ training camps in Afghanistan (King, 2014). 
In many cases, especially in the northern Afghanistan and its mountainous 
area, the Special Forces men operated horseback, along with the North Alliance 
forces. In the southern part of Afghanistan which was made mostly of desert 
lowlands, the off road movement was easier and the Special Forces used 
appropriate high speed vehicles  to move like the Desert Patrol Vehicle which apart 
from their speed carried heavy artillery too (King, 2014). In the southern Afghanistan, 
the SEALs had as their targets a series of Taliban and Al Qaeda fort hideouts which 
had already created since the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. One 
of them was the Zhawar Kili, a basis made in a deep of the eastern Afghanistan so 
the Islamist insurgents could operate against the Soviets (Neville, 2012a). 
Zhawar Kili was initially used as training camp and, due to its location near the 
Pakistani borders, was soon evolved to a basis of supplying provisions and guns and 
planning operations. It had 11 tunnels that reached even in 500m deep inside the 
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mountain and its facilities included dormitories, a mosque, weapons’ warehouses, 
repair shops, a garage, a hospital, a communications center and a cook house. In 
2001 it was substantially the basis of Al Qaeda (Neville, 2012a). 
A mission conducted by the SEALs found out the fact that Zhawar Kili was so 
spectacularly expanded and had such a significant role for Al Qaeda. It possessed 
more than 60 buildings on the surface and 70 caves in a vast area that covered in 
total 23 square kilometers and housed every kind of equipment like tanks and 
artillery. The intelligence discovered by the SEALs meant the beginning of a 9 days 
heavy bombardment by mainly B-1 and B-52s aircrafts as well as lighter tactical 
aircrafts of the Air Force, the Navy and the American allies, dropping more than 200 
tons of bombs in target. The SEALs, supported by the Marines, attached the basis 
after the airstrikes, killing or captivating the rest of the Al Qaeda fighters that were 
left alive, destroying their equipment and the Zhawar Kili caves (Neville, 2012a). 
During the Enduring Freedom operation, as well as in the next 12 years of 
counterterrorist operations that followed. It was demonstrated the capability of the 
Special Forces to execute missions with speed and effectiveness taking direct 
advantage of the data gathered in field. In February of 2002, a drone located mullah 
Khairhawa, a significant Taliban leader, in a building of the Patika province. Within 
just an hour since the targets location, a mission was already prepared and a team 
of 40 SEALs and Danish commandos flew to the building with a MH-53M Pave Low 
helicopter and arrested the mullah (King, 2014). 
In 2002, the strategic situation in Afghanistan was reversed and the North 
Alliance which due to Taliban superiority, in the beginning of the operations, had 
been isolated in a small piece of land in northern Afghanistan was now a first mover. 
Thanks to the American support in weapons and equipment and the help and 
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training by the Special Forces, the strikes that the North Alliance could make against 
the Taliban were so successful that by March of 2002 the North Alliance men 
entered the Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul, as winners and established a new 
transitional government. At the same time, the Taliban and Al Qaeda members either 
fled the country, got trapped in the mountains or tried to escape to Pakistan (Neville, 
2012a). 
After those developments, the Enduring Freedom operation achieve the goals 
initially set and the role of the Special Forces in that framework was over. Both 
administrative and field-operational sectors of the Special Forces ceased their 
actions and returned to their bases as the arrival of the conventional forces started. 
The conventional forces were the ones that took over the following operational parts 
from 2002 to 2014 when the almost total withdrawal of the allied forces took place 
(Bradley & Maurer, 2011). 
In the seven months that the operation Enduring Freedom lasted in 
Afghanistan, before and after the Taliban government, the American Special Forces 
coordinated and executed more than 75 significant missions, destroyed some 250 
tons of weapons and explosive materials and stroke direct blows, from the ground or 
with airstrikes, leading to the death of 115 Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders and the 
arrest of 107 Taliban commanders. The operational force which coordinated the 
Special Forces’ operations had an 100% success rate in those missions, an 
achievement which is even more impressive if we take into consideration the huge 
variety of missions that the Special Forces executed (King, 2014). 
Those impressive successes of the Special Forces during the Enduring 
Freedom operation showed their astonishing agility and their capability to operate in 
various combat environments as they can plan and successfully execute complex 
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and important missions in a very short time, as happened in the case of mullah 
Khairhawa being arrested by the SEALs. This kind of ability set the Special Forces 
as the defining factor when things would get difficult or a rapid reaction was needed, 
complementing the role of the conventional forces in Afghanistan until 2014. The 
focus of the Special Forces’ actions though stays on the Enduring Freedom 
operation for a variety of reasons and outcomes that are analyzed below (Bradley & 
Maurer, 2011). 
Now the most impressive characteristic of using the Special Forces in 
Afghanistan is that they substantially were the only ground forces that were used 
during the operation Enduring Freedom. In other words, the Special Forces won the 
war by themselves, in combination of course with the Air Force support and the 
North Alliance and the rest of the Afghan insurgent forces (Bradley & Maurer, 2011). 
This achievement becomes even more impressive if we take into 
consideration that the number of the American forces that operated in Afghanistan, 
until the Taliban government surrendered in Kabul, was less than 300 individuals, 
even if we count the CIA officers, the translators etc. Those less than 300 soldiers of 
the Special Forces managed to do something that neither the British Empire nor the 
Soviet Union were able to do formerly, to occupy Afghanistan (Bradley & Maurer, 
2011). 
This is the best example of an economy of force case, a fact that reconfirms 
that the Special Forces possess an astonishing relation between price and output 
concerning the defense budget. What makes it almost unbelievable is that this entire 
outcome was achieved with only four human losses; the three of them were a result 
of friendly fire, and minimal losses on equipment. The contrast with the Soviet losses 
that were close to 15000 soldiers is glaring (Feifer, 2009). 
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In just a few months’ time, the Special Forces men trained a large number of 
insurgents to fight against the Taliban regime. In addition, there was a successfully 
harmonious combination among the modern technologies of communication and 
surveillance, the smart guided weapons of the Air Force and the classic principles of 
guerilla warfare, leading to the sensational outcome of the Enduring Freedom 
operation that totally impressed the American public and the general public opinion 
when the operation’s details became more widely known (Neville, 2012a). 
In a few days since the beginning of the air strikes against Afghanistan on the 
9th of October 2001 the list of targets that the US government had was already 
exhausted as due to the continuous Soviet interventions from 1979 and on, 
Afghanistan was a country in which the targets camouflage emerged as a form of art 
and the air surveillance and strikes were almost impossible. This problem was 
solved with the arrival of the first Special Forces teams on the 19th of October. The 
Special Forces located a large number of targets and, directly and in real time, 
provided with these data the cockpits of the aircrafts of the Air Force and the Nav. 
This is a method that is better known as full-spectrum targeting and as soon as the 
smart bombs rain started the Taliban forces got dissolved (Neville, 2012a). 
Given that the Special Forces effectiveness against the Al Qaeda was a fact, 
it was more than obvious that they would take over the mission of the final blow 
against the leader of this terrorist group. With an extremely well organized and 
executed operation, on the 1st of May in 2011, American helicopters flew over the 
city of Abbottabad in north Pakistan and deployed a Special Forces team in the 
fortified settlement where Osama Bin Laden was hiding. In only 40 minutes the 
mission was successfully over with no casualties and the Special Forces echelon 
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carried the dead body of Bin Laden to an aircraft carrier in order to be officially 
recognized, concluding a manhunt that lasted for 10 years (Fury, 2011). 
 
II.  The US Special Forces in Iraq 
 
The fact that the Iraqi Freedom operation started just 18 months after the 
Enduring Freedom operation in Afghanistan was of decisive signification as the latter 
was a great success of the Special Forces that gave to the American political and 
military leadership the needed confidence to express their foreign policies 
accordingly (Neville, 2012b). 
In contrast to the Gulf War and the operation Desert Storm where the Special 
Forces had an important but more or less helping and supplemental role, in the 
operation Iraqi Freedom the Special Forces were not just in the initial planning but 
had the mission with probably the most significant responsibilities for the total 
success of the whole expedition. More specifically, as the diplomatic efforts from the 
US side to form a wide alliance, like they did in 1991, fell in vain the Special Forces 
would be the ones to replace the void that was created due to the lack of allied 
forces and bases in allied countries nearby (Keegan, 2010). 
The Special Forces teams that would take the above mentioned role started 
to being formed in 2002, leaving behind their then current missions. Even the forces 
that were participating in Afghanistan during the previous year left the responsibility 
to the conventional forces and returned to the USA in order to be re-equipped and 
prepared for the new mission. This mission in Iraq would put the USSOCOM limits - 
in regards to personnel, equipment and planning- to a really hard test as the Special 
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Forces were scattered, operating all over the world, from Colombia to Philippines 
etc. and of course Afghanistan (Cordesman, 2003). 
The Iraqi Freedom operation would suggest the most extended use of Special 
Forces in history. The Special Forces were to operate in five different sectors that 
were interconnected. a) In western Iraq, the initial target was to avert the launch of 
missiles against the US allies and the Special Forces would be the ones to fulfill the 
task of locating and destroying the missile bases, as they had done in Gulf War. b) In 
southern Iraq the Special Forces would support the course of the main force to 
Baghdad, executing mission of recognitions and infrastructure seizing. c) In the 
seaside areas, the Special Forces were responsible to find and clear obstacles and 
mines unto the port of Umm Qasr in order to secure the supply of the southern Iraq. 
Also they would take over the oil platforms in the Persian Gulf (Neville, 2012b). d) In 
north Iraq, the Special Forces would support the main course to Baghdad and help 
the Kurdish forces against the Saddam regime, securing the oil wells in Kirkuk and e) 
when the allied forces would enter Baghdad the Special Forces would provide their 
precious know-how in operations and intelligence (Neville, 2012b). 
For the general coordination of the Special Forces operations USSOCOM 
was, as usual, responsible. However, there was an innovative fact, in the framework 
of JSOFT; the commanders of the Joint Special Operations Task Force would be 
able to command the conventional forces. The Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld, was the one to approve this new decision as a result of the astonishing 
results of the Special Forces in Afghanistan and as it was ultimately proven was one 
of the most defining factors of the sweeping victory of the US in Iraq (Keegan, 2010). 
From 2002 and until the dawn of 2003, the Special Forces prepared 
themselves for the operations in Iraq. The larger units were preparing for the 5 
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sectors of their jurisdiction that were mentioned above. At the same time, the smaller 
units of support (for example vehicles of transport and supply, transport and 
attacking helicopters) started to form their positions for the invasion in Iraq that 
started in March of 2003 (Dailey & Webb, 2006). 
Below there is the analysis of the applied foreign policies through the actions 
of the American Special Forces per sector of responsibility.  
As already mentioned above, the most critical mission of the Special Forces was the 
aversion of the Iraqi missiles to be shot at the friendly countries around the area, as 
it had happened in 1991. This mission was set in the area of western Iraq and this 
geographic area was further divided in four sub-sectors of action, each one being 
patrolled by a Special Forces battalion with vehicles appropriate for desert patrol and 
the support of British and Australian men of the Special Air Service, antiaircraft 
missiles and aircrafts of ground assault (Dailey & Webb, 2006). 
 The motorized units of the Special Forces flooded the area of western Iraq by 
the 20th of March, 2003. In a few days, they had under their surveillance every 
possible missile launch spot and the Iraqi security forces put off so not even one 
missile was fired. The American Special Forces were equipped with the then new 
anti-tank missiles Javelin and had constantly disposable air support, proving to be 
highly capable of facing and destroying every Iraqi conventional force appeared in 
their route. In fact, the Special Forces led almost all the operations, limiting the 
conventional forces to a supporting role. In many cases, they took over and secured 
strategic targets like airports and even small cities, handing later on the control to the 
conventional forces that followed from the bases in Kuwait (Neville, 2012b). 
 The Special Forces in south Iraq were split in three units of action and their 
goal was to support the route of the 5th Army Corps, the Marines expeditionary force 
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and the British 1st Armored Division from Kuwait to Baghdad. The first unit of action 
(TF-52) would directly support the conventional forces, the second unit (TF-53) 
would work as reserve waiting to sally when the allied force would reach the Iraqi 
capital, as for the third unit, they had a supportive role for the first two units with 
helicopters of transport and attack (Neville, 2012b).  
The first two units were motorized and heavily armored and even though some of 
their missions were based on cover and surprise attacks, in the most of them they 
used heavy weapons to clash directly with the Iraqi forces as they waited for the 
support of the Artillery of the Air Force. This use of the Special Forces in the role of 
the conventional forces would easily be thought as reckless but they were very 
successful as the elite forces of percussion so they erased every doubt (Neville, 
2012b). 
 The missions of deep infiltration and recognition carried out by the TF-52 unit 
allowed them to located of the enemy forces and call for the air forces who destroyed 
the Iraqi units days before the conventional forces got there, being relieved of any 
possible extended conflicts. Furthermore, the Special Forces took rapidly the control 
of significant infrastructure of oil production and transportation, sometimes in such a 
rapid and successful way that when the conventional forces reached the place they 
did not even understand that the Special Forces had already been there. There were 
some more operations of capturing urban sites with the help of local insurgents who 
were against the Saddam regime (Neville, 2012b). 
However, the most important mission of the TF-52 unit was firstly the location of the 
enemy targets to be destroyed by the air strikes and the secondly the start of the 
very difficult mission of approaching the Shiite minority of the area who were enemy 
adjacent to Saddam Hussein. In addition, the TF-52 were responsible for the rescue 
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of the American hostages who were captured by the Iraqi forces at the ambush that 
they set to the 507th Supply Company (Neville, 2012b). 
 At the same time, the TF-53 unit had their own mission, to infiltrate in 
Baghdad, even earlier than it was calculated due to the fast march of the allied 
forces. When the 5th Army Corps entered Baghdad in early April, the Special Forces 
followed and collect valuable intel that let the conventional forces to occupy fast the 
whole city. Moreover, they captivated significant Iraqi officers and started to 
cooperate with the local population so the city could return to its normal 
everydayness as soon as possible (Neville, 2012b). 
 Regarding the missions of the Special Forces at the seaside areas of Iraq, 
they might have not the same resonance as the rest operations however they were 
operation of an extended scale and high difficulty, in which they took part a 
multinational force that included, among others, British and Polish commandos and 
the Navy SEALs. The SEALs and the Polish Special Forces occupied a number of oil 
platforms in the northern Persian Gulf while the British commandos of the Royal 
Marine Forces occupied the Al Faw peninsula. Alongside to these actions, the Navy 
Special Forces helped to the cleanup of the Umm Qasr port of the mines and in a 
few days the port was fully functional. Totally, the operations of the Special Forces at 
the seaside of Iraq were highly successful and may be considered as a prototype for 
future operations of the same nature (Keegan, 2010). 
 In the north area of Iraq, the missions had to deal with a series of political 
complications. The Turkish parliament voted down the American request for their 
forces to be allowed to have access to the Turkish military bases so they could 
operate against Iraq. This vote down was an unforeseen and important blow to the 
execution plan of Iraqi Freedom operation. The heavily armored American forces 
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that planned to attack to north Iraq through Turkey had to be moved to Kuwait, 
through the sea, where they would operate along the rest of the forces which would 
march north to Baghdad (Conte, 2005). 
Notwithstanding that the capture of Baghdad, as it proved, could be easily achieved 
by the south, the presence of the American force in north Iraq was more than 
obligatory in order to protect the Kurdish population, the Kurdish fighters and the oil 
wells of the area from the 11 Iraqi Army Divisions that were in area, north of Tikrit. 
Therefore, this void that was created by the inability to use the conventional forces 
had to be thoroughly covered by the Special Forces that according to the initial plan 
had as their responsibility just to support the conventional forces who would invade 
in north Iraq (Conte, 2005). 
 The onus was on Colonel Cleveland of the 10th Special Forces Unit that 
operated in the area and dealt with how the Kurds of north Iraq could be reclaimed 
against Saddam even since the operation Desert Storm in 1991. The Cleveland 
administration already possessed a very good knowledge of the area, the population 
and the language. Even so, the goals that the Special Forces had to achieve were 
very ambitious and difficult, including: The protection of the Kurds and the oil 
facilities in north Iraq, the fixation of the 11 Iraqi Divisions so they could not be able 
to help in Baghdad’s defense, the search of weapons of mass destruction and 
possible terrorist nests, the captivation of high ranked officers of the Saddam regime 
and the aversion of extensive operations by the Kurdish insurgents so there would 
not exist any motive for the Turkish government to invade in north Iraq (Keegan, 
2010). 
As it is rational, all those aims seemed to be like an enormous burden for just the 
shoulders of the Special Forces, especially if we take into consideration that the 
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initial Colonel Cleveland’s unit was formed by only two battalions of Special Forces 
with just light weapons and some Land Rovers. Indeed, until recently, all those goals 
would normally be assigned to a full army corps of conventional forces that would 
include at least two full Divisions plus the support units (Neville, 2012b). 
 However, the big success of the Special Forces in Afghanistan had changed 
the perspective of the foreign policy makers and as it was shown in Donald 
Rumsfeld’s decision for the JSOFT creation, the Special Forces could constitute the 
core and the administration of a larger force. In that way and in order to strengthen 
the Cleveland’s units in north Iraq, the USSOCOM made sure that it would take 
place a rapid air transportation of the 3rd Unit of Special Forces with heavy 
equipment and vehicles designed for desert, of the 173rd airborne brigade as well as 
of M1A1 Abrams tanks of the 1st armored brigade from American bases in Europe. 
In addition, the Special Forces had at the support of B-1 and B-52 bombers from 
military bases in Great Britain (Neville, 2012b). 
Of course all the above transportation took several days to be completed but the 
Cleveland’s forces were significantly reinforced and ready to operate. The Special 
Forces cooperated with the Kurdish insurgents and repulsed the Iraqi forces out of 
the Iraqi Kurdistan marching east towards Kirkuk. There took place some really 
ferocious battles between the Special Forces and the heavily armored Iraqi forces 
with the Special Forces winning those battles by themselves only with the support of 
the antitank Javelin missiles (Neville, 2012b). 
At the same time that the forces who operated from Kuwait to Baghdad occupied the 
Iraqi capital, the Cleveland’s forces had occupied Kirkuk and the oil wells of 
Kurdistan, the city of Mosul and other important populated sites of north Iraq. The 
majority of the 11 Iraqi Divisions in the area was taken by surprise of the heavy 
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firepower of the Special Forces and either surrendered or retreated towards Tikrit, a 
fact that made the operations in north Iraq equally successful as the rest despite the 
initial difficulties and the superiority in numbers of the Iraqi forces in that area 
(Cordesman, 2003). 
In total and in time of less than one month, the Special Forces that operated 
under the JSOFT administration had successfully conducted one of the most 
impressive and effective expeditions of non-conventional warfare in history. Even 
though the Special Forces did not operate only by themselves as they did in 
Afghanistan, this time they had to face a far more numerous and better equipped 
enemy and managed to undoubtedly win even in open battles with forces that 
possessed heavy and armored equipment (Cordesman, 2003). 
Certainly, as in the case of Afghanistan, the war in Iraq did not just end with 
the spectacular prevalence of the allied forces in 2003 but it continued for years in 
the form of guerilla warfare and anti-terrorist operations until the American forces 
were withdrawn in 2011 and of course is carried on with a different form today. 
Nevertheless, as it happened with the Enduring Freedom operation, the Special 
Forces started to withdraw by the end of the Iraqi Freedom operation, letting the 
security to the conventional forces. Some few Special Forces units remained in Iraq 
as forces of rapid reaction for possible sensitive missions as it happened in 
Afghanistan but their main role was concluded after the completion of Iraqi Freedom 
operation in April 2003 (Priest & Arkin, 2011). 
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Chapter V: Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus 
 
I. Stanley McChrystal 
Stanley McChrystal was born in Kansas in 1954 raised in a military family. His father 
was a general too having served in Germany after the WWII and later on in the 
Pentagon. We could say that the young Stanley’s future was predestined; he studied 
in the famous US military academy at West Point coming out as a second lieutenant 
in 1976. In 1979 he graduated from the Special Forces School in Fort Bragg and two 
years later from the Infantry School in Fort Benning (Jaffe & Cloud, 2010). He served 
as an officer of the Intelligence Agency in South Korea, as a training officer in the US 
and then he was transferred to the famous Rangers. Later on he was trained for a 
place in the General Staff, got a master’s degree in International Relations and took 
part in the Gulf War as a Special Forces officer. From 1997 to 1999 he was the 
commander of a Rangers regiment. He then got promoted to major general in 2001, 
served in Kuwait and in the administration of the Enduring Freedom operation in 
Afghanistan. He was serving in the Pentagon as a member of the JSOFT when the 
operation Iraqi Freedom started (Jaffe & Cloud, 2010). As the war on terror carried 
on, McChrystal became the chief administrator of the Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC) from 2003 to 2008; he was placed in Afghanistan, Iraq and in the 
advanced headquarters of the US Central Administration in Qatar. Stanley 
McChrystal personally commanded the operation of the Special Forces in the 
operation Iraqi Freedom and his work was described as vital (McChrystal, 2013). His 
successes as the commander of JSOC included the captivation of Saddam Hussein 
and the execution with an airstrike of Al Qaeda’s no 2 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. 
However, there is black spot in McChrystal’s career in Iraq as his 6-26 Action Team 
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of Special Forces, who among others was responsible for the location of Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi, was charged of prisoners’ abuse at the prison camps in Iraq and 34 of its 
members were punished when the facts became widely known (Bolger, 2014). 
 In the dawn of 2007, the Special Forces in Iraq, under the command of 
McChrystal and the support of the CIA, executed a variety of successful secret 
missions resulting to either capturing or killing many of the significant Al Qaeda 
leaders in Iraq. It was a fact that this success and this new level of operational ability 
of the Special Forces was a result of great cooperation between the Special Forces 
and the CIA, something that did not use to happen extensively in the past and it was 
attributed to McChrystal’s work. General McChrystal managed to modernize and 
thoroughly transform the JSOC to a force such flexible and lethal unseen before, the 
key factor of the American successes in Iraq (McChrystal et al, 2015). 
 Due to the above mentioned foreign policy wins, McChrystal was considered 
to be candidate either for the commanding place of the USSOCOM in 2008 or as 
successor of the general David Petraeus as a commander of the multinational force 
in Iraq. In the end he was chosen for the place at the USSOCOM but his 
appointment got delayed until the August of 2008 due to the Armed Forces 
Commission in the Senate that asked for more information regarding the prisoners’ 
abuse incident, which was mentioned above, and the possible involvement of 
McChrystal (Jaffe & Cloud, 2010). 
 In 2009 McChrystal took over the command of all NATO forces in Afghanistan 
and finally got promoted as a general. As soon as he took the reins in Afghanistan 
administration he started the operation “Khanjar” which was the largest attacking 
operation since the start of the war in Afghanistan. Later in the same year, Stanley 
McChrystal, through a personal report of 66 pages, asked from the Ministry of 
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Defense for more military forces to reinforce the then existing ones, warning that the 
allied forces were in danger of losing control of the country if their forces would not 
be strengthened in numbers (McChrystal, 2013). In addition, the same year, general 
McChrystal publicly stated that the allied forces needed a reinforcement of 30000 or 
40000 soldiers more in order to defeat the Taliban's regime thoroughly, something 
that led to a rebuke by the White House while some military officers requested that 
McChrystal should have been fired due to lack of discipline and leakage of such 
critical information (Jaffe & Cloud, 2010). Those statements though and the 
information of the report to the Ministry of Defense that became publicly known was 
a product of McChrystal’s try to press president Obama to approve the extra forces 
shipment in Afghanistan (Bolger, 2014). 
 For the same reason, general McChrystal and his staff gave an interview that 
the Rolling Stone magazine published and in which they were highly critical towards 
some officers of the White House, for example the Vice President Joe Biden, the 
consultant of National Security James L. Jones, the ambassador in Afghanistan and 
others. That interview caused an uprise of reactions that finally led to McChrystal’s 
resignation from his position as the commander of the allied forces in Afghanistan, 
after a high pressure by the White House too. A little later he resigned from the 
American military in general disappointed by the Obama administration and their 
foreign policy regarding the withdrawal of the American forces from Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Bolger, 2014). 
 Despite the turbulence that led to McChrystal’s inglorious resignation from the 
American military, his contribution to the US foreign policy successes through the 
Special Forces is undoubtedly very significant. His main contribution was the 
modernization of the Special Forces and the cooperation with the CIA echelons that 
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knew better the place, the language and had direct access to intel, a fact that makes 
the Special Forces/CIA combination highly effective in anti-terrorist operations, a 
kind of operations that is increasingly taken by the Special Forces (McChrystal et al., 
2015). Furthermore, as the current situation is shaped nowadays, it seems that 
McChrystal position, in regards to the constant and fortified presence of the 
American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and the aggressive approach on the war on 
terrorism against Al Qaeda and other similar organizations, is vindicated by the 
recent developments (ISIS) and the collapse of the succession state that the 
American forces withdrawal left in Iraq (Posen, 2015). 
 
II. David Petraeus 
David Petraeus was born in New York in 1952 and has Dutch origins as his 
father, a captain from the Netherlands, came to the US when the WWII started. 
Petraeus graduated from the military academy of West Point in 1974 and then until 
1983 he studied at the College of the Military General Staff in Fort Leavenworth. Two 
years later he got a master’s degree in public administration and then in 1987 a PhD 
in international relations focusing on the Vietnam war. He was a professor of 
international relations for two years in the military academy of the USA (Broadwell & 
Loeb, 2012).  
In 1995 he was transferred for the first time outside the US, as a commander 
of the NATO operations in Haiti and then in Bosnia however his first experience in a 
theater of war came a few years later, in 2003, when he took part in the Iraqi 
Freedom operation, ranked as a major general. Petraeus was the commander of the 
101st Airborne Division as the 5th Army Corps marched towards Baghdad. On this 
route, the 101st Airborne Division engaged in ferocious battles south of Baghdad, in 
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Karbala, Hilla and Najaf. After Baghdad fell, Petraeus’ Division executed the most 
durable attack with helicopters in history, trying to reach the geographic area of 
Ninawa in north Iraq (Ricks, 2009). 
David Petraeus and his 101st Airborne Division stayed in Iraq, placed in 
Mosul, after the initial victory of the US and the allies in order to stabilize the whole 
situation there. In the days that he spent in Iraq, he was one of the first American 
officers to highlight the difficulties that would follow after the fall of Baghdad and the 
fact that despite the quick and easy victory, the engagement of the US forces in Iraq 
would not end easily and they would have to stay in the country for a long time 
(Robinson, 2009). 
In Mosul, a city of two million people, Petraeus used traditional anti-terrorist 
methods in order to secure the city’s stability. His attacking tactics were targeted and 
discreet. David Petraeus focused more on how could the American foreign policy be 
enhanced and integrated at the local society. With his suggestions and actions the 
local economy was strengthened, they trained the local security forces, held open 
elections for the local council, organized a program of public constructions, 
reinforced the political procedures encouraging the public speech and started almost 
4500 new programs of infrastructure reconstruction. The most important public 
construction under the Petraeus administration was the repair and reopening of the 
University of Mosul. The American general emboldened the use of the financial 
resources available for public constructions explaining that “money is our 
ammunition in this battle on terrorism”, a phrase that was ultimately introduced into 
the military operations doctrine against terrorism (Bacevich, 2008).  
This approach is most probably a result of Petraeus’ experience from his former 
placements in missions of reconstruction and development in Haiti and Bosnia. He 
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saw the reconstructions in Iraq should have been a central military target that the US 
foreign policy ought to take over as long as the Iraqi government in Baghdad was still 
in total disruption. David Petraeus and his Special Forces unit worked harder than 
anyone else in Iraq to gain the Iraqi people’s trust and as a result of this hard effort, 
the General earned the nickname “King David” used by the majority of the Iraqi 
people (Ricks, 2009). 
 The 101st Airborne Division left Mosul in 2004 to be replaced by a regiment of 
the 1st Army Corps but its operational forces were too small with only a division of 
light armored vehicles. However, the next summer the commander of the city was 
assassinated, the Sunnis of the local council left and the political authority of the 
area totally collapsed in November 2004 as the insurgents unleashed severe 
attacks, paralyzing the city of Mosul and leading the American forces to lose control 
of the city (Ricks, 2009).  
 The city of Mosul substantially collapsed after Petraeus left. Even though 
some critics said that it was the General’s fault on the people he appointed on the 
local council or that the Division with the Stryker vehicles which replaced the 
Petraeus 101st Division was not that capable due to smaller numbers, the most 
prevailing and most rational explanation is that the substitutes of Petraeus failed to 
continue his work and take part in the local governing procedure with the same 
effectiveness. The officers that were responsible for Mosul, after Petraeus, did not 
respect the principles that David Petraeus had set so aptly on antiterrorist operations 
and they behaved more like conquerors than governors, negating all the positive 
work that the General had previously accomplished (Bolger, 2014). 
 Even though the 101st Airborne returned to the US, Petraeus stayed in Iraq 
and got appointed as commander of the new Multinational Security Transition 
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Command in Iraq. It was an administrative body which aimed at training, equipping 
and supervising the new army, new police and security forces of Iraq, also caring for 
the manufacturing of the security infrastructures like training camps, police stations 
and border outposts. David Petraeus stayed at this position for fifteen months 
achieving great results despite the constant battles with the insurgents all over the 
country of Iraq. In fact, he was responsible for the training and equipment provision 
of 100.000 Iraqi security forces with the majority of them taking part in the battles 
against the insurgents. The infrastructure projects that were carried out under his 
initiative cost 11 billion dollars, an amount which was the biggest military supply 
since the WWII era (Bacevich, 2008). According to an article written by Petraeus in 
September 2004 and published at the Washington Post, the progress in the creation 
of the Iraqi new and American influenced security forces was more than significant 
despite some problems like the terrorist attacks. He even said that the Iraqi side felt 
ready and willing to accept and carry the burden of transition in governing and 
security (Jaffe & Cloud, 2010). 
 The next year Petraeus returned to the US and until 2007 he was the 
commander of the Army Combined Arms Center. Along with lieutenant general 
Mattis of the Marines and a large group of military, journalists and academics -
chosen by Petraeus and Mattis- they published the Battlefield Manual on the 
counter-terrorism operations. In addition, Petraeus introduced counter-terrorism as 
an updated course in the training of the military academies of the US focusing on the 
Special Forces techniques and not on the conventional forces approach that the 
trainee soldiers had been learning up to that point (Bacevich, 2008). As a result, 
Petraeus highlighted the need that the soldiers must learn how to think and not just 
fight and that their officers must be more flexible and adaptive. For the above 
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reasons Petraeus is considered to be the leading specialist in the world when it 
comes to counter-terrorism operations (Ricks, 2009). Later on, Petraeus took his 
ideas and based on the new counter-terrorism doctrine that was implemented in Iraq; 
he published a series of instructions and advice for the commanders of the 
operations against the insurgents. The work of Petraeus can be directly developed 
by the Special Forces that are, at the most times, the first and main appliers in the 
battlefield (Petraeus 2006; Petraeus 2008).  
 For his work on the reshaping the American foreign policy, in January 2007, 
Petraeus got appointed by President George W. Bush as the commander of the 
Multinational Force in Iraq. He set as the primary goal of the American foreign policy 
the security of the local population, especially in Baghdad, and the cooperation with 
the Iraqi security forces. He also stressed the need to increase the allied forces in 
Iraq as the goal of solid and secure conditions demanded a constant presence of 
forces, especially in the areas that were under the threat of terrorist attacks. 
Petraeus also brought up again the great importance of infrastructure, employment 
programs and amelioration of the everyday lives of the Iraqi people (Ricks, 2009) 
During the days of Petraeus administration, the Multinational Force tried to 
cooperate with the Iraqi government to achieve the above mentioned targets. To do 
so, they had to demarcate the Iraqis that were willing to cooperate and the ones who 
were sworn enemies to the new government under the American influence. 
Consequently, they firstly had to relentlessly persecute the latter, secondly to clear 
the areas that were sensitive to the enemy and care that those areas would remain 
clear and finally to continue on the development of the security forces of Iraq, even 
to expand the new Iraqi army with volunteer fighters. Those strategies that Petraeus 
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suggested became known as “Petraeus Doctrine”, a term that is widely used since 
then (Bacevich, 2008). 
 In July 2007, David Petraeus said that the situation in Baghdad shows 
impressive signs of normality even though there still existed many problems, most of 
them as a result of the ferocious battles among Sunnis and Shiites that took place in 
2006. Despite those signs of steadiness, Petraeus warned the American government 
that the situation in Iraq remained unsettled and the presence of more than 150.000 
allied forces would be necessary even after the end of 2007. The General thought of 
himself as neither an optimist nor a pessimist but as a realist and tried to project a 
precise image of the conditions in Iraq and their difficulties (Robinson, 2009). 
However, in the fall of 2007, he reached to a variety of positive results, 
noticing that the religious conflicts were drastically reduced and the Allied/Iraqi forces 
had caused heavy blows to the Shiites insurgents and the Al Qaeda -that the Iraqi 
people had already started to reject. Based on that image which was confirmed by 
the battlefield statistics, Petraeus predicted that the reduction of the allied forces 
would be possible soon enough; the same applied for the responsibilities transition to 
the Iraqi security forces (Ricks, 2009). 
Those positive predictions continued in the next year too, in fact during the spring of 
2008, with the allied forces gradually being withdrawn and the counter-terrorism 
operations being held mostly by the Iraqi security forces, the statistics of the terrorist 
attacks hit the lowest percentage of the last four years then. However, Petraeus 
pointed that there should be no room for early celebrations and terms like “victory” in 
such kind of war as it wasn’t a conventional operation that an army just occupies a 
hill, raise their flag and then go back home (Robinson, 2009). 
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Nonetheless, David Petraeus service in Iraq ended in September 2008 as he 
returned in the US to be the commander at the US Central Command which is the 
responsible body for the coordination of the American operations in 20 countries. His 
administration in Iraq was considered to be extremely successful and responsible for 
the effective redesigning of the American foreign policy under such adverse 
conditions (Ricks, 2009). At the end of his service in Iraq, he published an article at 
Military Review where he pointed out 14 important observations on governing and 
counter-terrorism operations which constitute critical outcomes and lessons for the 
use of Special Forces as a tool of foreign policy. Petraeus contribution was also 
significant at the reexamination and reshaping of the American foreign policy in 
general through his principles on counter-terrorism operations, rejecting the simple 
terms of win or lose, focusing instead on the aggregate development of the military 
operations (Porch, 2013). 
During his service at the US Central Command, he explained that even if the 
American Special Forces were the best counter-terrorism forces in the world, this 
fact would not be enough by itself to neutralize the terrorist threats. It is a far more 
complex procedure that needs the participation of the government and its stark 
devotion to foreign policy principles that would include compound operations like 
counter-terrorism, local reconstruction and affiliation of the local population 
(Broadwell & Loeb, 2012). 
In 2010 Petraeus was appointed as commander of the allied forces in 
Afghanistan, replacing General McChrystal who, as mentioned above, resigned after 
his criticism on the American government. However, Petraeus stayed at this position 
just for one year as he became Director of the CIA and withdrew from the army. His 
wisdom in counter-terrorism made him ideal for this position but the career of this 
69 
 
great military man ended ingloriously as he was forced to resign after the FBI 
revealed that Petraeus had an extramarital affair, supposedly being suspicious for a 
possible disclosure of secret intelligence to his lover (Porch, 2013). 
In contrast to Stanley McChrystal, Petraeus never commanded personally any 
operation of the Special Forces. His central philosophy was that every army force, 
even the conventional forces, could apply his principles of cooperation with the local 
population, emphasis on the infrastructure, local governing and counter-terrorism 
operations, something that was widely applied when he was in Mosul. From this 
wider philosophy inflicted on the expression of the American foreign policy, it was the 
Special Forces that took the most out of the significant works of General Petraeus 
(Bacevich, 2009). 
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Chapter VI: Examining the outcomes of the Afghanistan and Iraq cases 
 
The examination of the outcome of using the Special Forces as a tool of the 
American foreign policy in Afghanistan and Iraq is not just a simple case. First of all, 
both conflicts are characterized by an initial short phase of a rapid expedition which 
in both cases managed to achieve its targets quick and easy. Then both conflicts 
had a second phase of lingering peacekeeping and counter-terrorism operations 
which evolved in a war of attrition lasting for years. Especially in the second phase of 
the operations, as David Petraeus stressed, one cannot just comply with 
conventional and simplistic terms of victory and loss (Bacevich, 2008). Even so, it 
remains not simple to evaluate both phases, even the first short phase, as it is not as 
simple as it may initially seem. 
 
I. The outcome of the Afghanistan case 
In the case of Afghanistan, even the impressive success of the American 
Special Forces during the operation Enduring Freedom and the sweeping collapse of 
the Taliban regime, it is not easy or simple to be evaluated. The most impressive 
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characteristic of using the Special Forces in Afghanistan is that those forces are in 
substance the only American ground forces that were used in the operation Enduring 
Freedom, with the only exception being the individual local engagement of other 
forces in some specific operations. Essentially, the American Special Forces won the 
war themselves, in combination of course with the aerial support of the American Air 
Force and the army forces of North Alliance and the rest of the Afghan guerrillas 
(Neville, 2012a) 
If we were to enclose the operation Enduring Freedom in 6 simple steps to 
explain the great success of the Special Forces as a tool of the American foreign 
policy then we would have: 
1.    The difficult geography of Afghanistan and the lack of previous military 
experience within Afghanistan favored the use of Special Forces over 
the conventional forces. 
2.    The Special Forces worked closely with the CIA before the official 
intervention contacting the local population in order to either train them 
or influence them also having the chance to locate Al Qaeda targets. 
3.    The process of ground recognition was extremely difficult due to the 
wide network of bunkers and supplies already made since the 1980s 
from the war against the Soviet Union and could not be made neither 
by conventional forces nor even technological means. 
4.    In general, the Special Forces completed over 75 missions, destroyed 
over 250 tons of weapons and explosives and killed 115 Al Qaeda 
officers. For the first time in American foreign policy history this was a 
mission with 100% success. 
5.    The Special Forces had only 4 losses, the 3 of them accidentally 
caused by friendly fires. What makes this even more prestigious is the 
contrast to the Soviets losses in the same ground which were around 
to 15000 soldiers. 
6.    Finally the Special Forces successfully prepared the ground for the 
deployment of the American and their allies’ conventional forces. 
  
This is the best model of a case of economy of force, something that confirms 
that the Special Forces possess an astonishing relation between price and output 
concerning the defense budget. This outcome justified the further raise in the Special 
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Forces budget during the years that followed after their engagement in Afghanistan 
(Wright, 2010). 
Consequently, on the one hand the operation in Afghanistan is faced as a 
revolution in foreign policy, meaning that the use of the Special Forces in 
combination with the smart bombs -their targeting is ensured by the Special Forces- 
and the existence of native allies shapes the “Afghan model” which constitutes an 
operational prototype that can be reproduced in several cases that the American 
foreign policy needs to be expressed, totally intertwined with the theory of aggressive 
realism. On the other hand, there is the view that the success of the operation 
Enduring Freedom was only a matter of luck and was a product of local conjectures 
thus it cannot be applied anywhere else (Biddle, 2002). 
So at this side of those who see the sweeping victory of the Special Forces in 
Afghanistan as an outcome of luck use as their main arguments the special culture 
of Afghanistan which is split in different tribes fighting one another and can change 
sides easily and fast, as well as the fact that the Taliban were inexperienced and 
untrained in battle so they did not have serious capability to resist (Biddle, 2002). 
However, the accession of the majority of the Afghan military in the American 
forces was made after the US and their allies took control over the Taliban forces 
and not before, something that shows that this was a result of the success of the 
American Special forces and not a cause of the success. Moreover, even though the 
Taliban were badly trained and mostly unwilling to fight, the same cannot be said for 
the Al Qaeda fighters who were highly trained in various terrorist camps and proved 
to be able, savage and fanatic warriors (Neville, 2012a). 
On the other side, the supporters of the “Afghan model” believe that the smart 
weapons can neutralize the enemy from a long distance before they can even 
contact the men of the American Special Forces or their native allies. Therefore, 
since the smart weapons do the real job, even some unskilled militia groups or 
irregular fighters could be sufficient to ally with the US Special Forces, as the only 
they need to do in practice is to protect the American Special Forces from the 
potential survivors of the air strikes and then occupy the abandoned enemy land 
(Wright, 2010). 
In reality though, the operations in Afghanistan usually included hard close 
quarter battles. The Al Qaeda fighters many times managed to escape the air strikes 
and the strike back closing the American Special Forces and their allies before they 
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can even trace them. In the battles of Bai Beche, the AutoRoute 4 and of the 
operation ANACONDA, the Al Qaeda fighters had to be repelled through rabid close 
quarter battles. In Tora Bora, the inability of the American allies to send properly 
trained troops in the battle against Al Qaeda allowed the terrorists to win and get 
away before the American backup was sent on time (Wright, 2010). 
So according to the professor of National Security Stephen Biddle (2004) 
neither the one nor the other view is precise as the operation Enduring Freedom has 
many similarities with a medium scale conflict of the 20th century, though with the 
difference that the American side had in their disposal a significantly heavier fire 
support than the other side. This kind of perception has different implications in the 
examination of this specific expression of the American foreign policy (Biddle, 2004). 
Of course, that does not mean that the smart weapons of the Special Forces, 
even more the combination of both, are not extremely valuable for a successful 
aggressive foreign policy. There is no army in 20th century that had this kind of fire 
support and at such extend like the American forces had in Afghanistan. However, 
all of this fire power manage to exterminate many but not all of the Al Qaeda fighters 
and as it is already known from the WWI and the use of heavy machine guns against 
the enemy trenches, even the minimal number of survivors if they are equipped with 
modern machine guns can cause huge losses in untrained fighters, as the allies of 
the US in Afghanistan had been (Robinson, 2013). 
Consequently, the key to success, so in 1916 as in 2002 and later, is the 
combination of a heavy fire power with agile and highly trained ground forces who 
can reclaim the results of the air strikes so to overpower the enemy’s resistance. 
However, this level of agility and training is way beyond of many potential native 
allies of the US in future possible conflicts (Biddle, 2004). 
In Afghanistan, the US allies with the support of the American air force 
managed to easily neutralize the unwilling and untrained Taliban but had a difficult 
time against the properly trained Al Qaeda fighters despite the advantage that were 
given to them by the American airstrikes and the abilities of the American Special 
Forces who controlled the battle strategy. So we can say that the weak point of the 
US is their allies as when they face enemies who have the will and the ability to fight, 
the allies must possess at least the same qualifications. (Biddle, 2004). 
The examination of the Special Forces’ use in the second phase of the war in 
Afghanistan is even more difficult case. To begin with, after the Taliban regime 
74 
 
collapsed the majority of the Special Forces left the battleground and returned to 
their bases, leaving the allied conventional forces responsible to secure the ground 
and eradicate the Al Qaeda fighters. Some Special Forces units remained in 
Afghanistan of course, taking a very critical role as rapid reaction force for 
antiterrorist operations as happened in the case of the assassination of Bin Laden. 
However, in most cases their contribution is difficult to be measured separately from 
the contribution of the conventional forces in this phase of war (Finlan, 2009) 
In addition, in this second phase of the operations it is difficult to define what 
is victory or loss in such a complex expression of the American foreign policy. There 
is no doubt that in the first phase and the Special Forces operation Enduring 
Freedom the American foreign policy was sweepingly successful however much 
larger military forces had to remain in Afghanistan for years. As former President 
Obama then said, the success of the American foreign policy had to do in substance 
with the dissolution of the Al Qaeda’s terrorist network in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
and the prevention of terrorists to return in both countries in the future (Geraghty, 
2011). 
However, the stay of the allied forces in Afghanistan developed into a long-
standing war of attrition, a war that the US and their allies were doomed to lose as 
their political will to remain in Afghanistan would inevitably be over at some point (as 
it happened) while the terrorists of the Al Qaeda had just not to lose and wait the 
allied forces to leave. According to the US Special Forces major Jim Gant (2009) the 
success of the American foreign policy is defined as the achieving the security and 
prosperity of the Afghan people in the long term (Gant, 2009). 
The state of Afghanistan never possessed an effective central government but 
functioned in a traditional tribe system. Therefore, instead of focusing in the creation 
of a central authority that would never have wide acceptance, the US had to focus on 
working on the existed social system of Afghanistan gaining the trust of the one tribe 
after the other (Gant, 2009). 
An important factor that led to the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan was their 
obsession to oppose this tribal system. To secure stability after their withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, the US had to work on those tribes, approaching each tribe separately 
and taking part in building and rebuilding and in the state’s infrastructure projects, 
working at a local governing level, as General Petraeus did exactly with his 101st 
Airborne Division in Iraq (Ricks, 2009). 
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This should have been the recipe of a successful foreign policy in Afghanistan 
and should be in future conflicts for the US. This is a strategy that the Special Forces 
are the most suitable to execute and it is no accident that this foreign policy strategy 
was developed, suggested and applied by members of the Special Forces who 
operated in groups which served as connections for each Afghan tribe separately, 
the Tribal Engagement Teams or TETs as they were called, taking part in 
construction and rebuilding projects, fighting with the tribe against the Taliban as a 
common enemy and eventually gaining their trust (Gant, 2009). 
In any case, one of the most significant lessons that the US took for their 
foreign policies by engaging their Special Forces in Afghanistan had to do with the 
very nature of the operations. In the start of the operation Enduring Freedom the 
Special Forces were dispersed all over the world and exhausted from a decade of 
constant operations in various war theaters. It is understood that the preparation of 
the Special Forces soldiers needs intensive and time consuming training and cannot 
happen overnight when a conflict may occur. In addition, the lack of supporting 
equipment for the Special Forces was a chronic problem and was apparent in 
Afghanistan and wasn’t solved in the Iraq operation, which started 18 months after 
Afghanistan, either (Boot, 2014). 
As a result of the above, during the Defense Evaluation that took place in 
2006, a plan for extension of the Special Forces was approved. In some cases, new 
training schools and facilities were created and of course more advanced equipment 
was acquired. In general, there is no doubt that the operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan is one of the most important and most impressive achievements of the 
US foreign policy made by the US Special Forces and this success was used to 
make more effective the future actions related to the American foreign policy 
(Robinson, 2013). 
Besides, the results were already obvious in the operations that followed 1.5 
year later in Iraq. A joint Special Forces operations structure was created that was 
responsible for the control of the whole operation in Iraq, as a result of the 
astonishing success of the Special Forces in Afghanistan, something that led to a 
sweeping victory in Iraq and a very significant level up in the American foreign policy 
(Cordesman, 2003).  
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II. The outcome of the Iraq case 
 
 The case of Iraq is as difficult to be evaluated as the case of Afghanistan 
more or less due to the same reasons. It was a war of two phases, one initial rapid 
expedition and then a war of attrition with constant counter-terrorism operations and 
terrorist attacks from the other side. As in Afghanistan, what constitutes the answer 
to a dilemma between victory or loss, a success or a failure, is a complicated 
process (Bacevich, 2010). 
  Additionally, in contrast to the Afghanistan case where the Special Forces 
were the only ground force to express the American foreign policy, in Iraq the 
Special Forces were just a part of a much larger ground force. At least, the 
effectiveness of the Special Forces and the new doctrine that provided for the great 
extent of the Special Forces’ independence meant that their success could be 
evaluated relatively easy, at least in regards to the first phase of war, as in the 
second phase the majority returned back to base (Neville, 2012b). 
However, we cannot evaluate the Iraq case without the comparison to the 
Afghanistan case as it was the one that influenced and shaped the planning of the 
Iraqi Freedom operation which started just 18 months after the operations in 
Afghanistan. So we could say that the American political and military administrations 
had acquire a feeling of great trust in the Special Forces capabilities giving them the 
role of the main exponent of the American foreign policy, even covering the void that 
was created by the negation of some allied countries to either support with their army 
or their military bases (Cordesman, 2003). The American operations in north Iraq are 
the perfect example as the sudden negation of Turkey to allow the American 
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invasion to start from the Turkish territory strongly changed the initial plan and made 
the execution of the new one to be assigned to the Special Forces instead of the 
conventional forces. This happened because the success of the Special Forces in 
Afghanistan had already changed the foreign policy making and as it was shown by 
the directives of Donald Rumsfeld for the JSOFT constitution, the Special Forces 
were the core of the command of a larger force and in extension the core of the 
American foreign policy in Iraq (Neville, 2012b). So, the Afghanistan case influenced 
the Iraq case and, in fact, created high hopes and expectations regarding the use of 
Special Forces in Iraq which were solemnly confirmed, especially in the west Iraq 
operation where the Special Forces took the control of a huge theater of war by 
themselves (Mazzetti, 2013). 
Even though the counter-terrorism operations in Iraq against Al Qaeda and 
Saddam’s supporters lasted for years, the initial Special Forces expedition in the 
framework of the operation Iraqi Freedom was a classic case of military strategic and 
an emphatic foreign policy expression with aggressive realism approach. It was the 
largest expedition of Special Forces ever made as more than 10.000 soldiers and 
auxiliary staff of the Special Forces took part in the operation Iraqi Freedom. Just the 
first phase of the Special Forces operations was much larger and complex than the 
respective cases of D-Day in Normandy or the Vietnam war (Keegan, 2010). 
As it happened it the Enduring Freedom operation in Afghanistan, although 
the engagement of the conventional forces was minimal, the key factor during the 
Iraqi Freedom operation was the effectiveness of the Special Forces that allowed the 
larger numbers of conventional forces -especially the 5th Army Corps and the British 
forces- to complete the main operations and fulfill their aims after only six weeks of 
hard battles (Cordesman, 2003). In this short period of time, the Special Forces won 
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their own battles, in substance they liberated more than half the geographical area of 
Iraq, an achievement very impressive if we take into consideration that it was made 
by 10.000 soldiers and staff in a country larger than Germany or Japan (Keegan, 
2010). The soldiers, the Navy and the Air Force who all acted under the command of 
USSOCOM proved themselves greatly capable warriors expressing a foreign policy 
full of energy and thirst for victories. The tactical success and the use of ultramodern 
weapons, communication equipment and vehicles, all structurally used under the 
Special Forces command, are a prototype and a landmark for the further 
development of the Special Forces as a tool of the American foreign policy for the 
next decade and onwards (Cordesman, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
III. A comparison among the two cases and the outcomes from the 
two conflicts 
 
As it is already analyzed above, the evaluation of the two cases separately 
hided some difficulties so it makes sense that the comparison of the two cases is not 
an easier task. The most critical issue is that the outcomes of the two cases cannot 
be directly compared with each other. We don’t have to deal with two different 
foreign policy approaches that can be compared for their effectiveness as the foreign 
policy in the Iraq case was clearly influenced by the one of Afghanistan, substantially 
by being based on the Afghanistan outcomes and creating a new strategic doctrine 
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with the American Special Forces as the coordinator force and main exponent 
(Mazzetti, 2013). 
As stated above, after the extreme success of the Special Forces in 
Afghanistan, there was a widely expressed view that the Afghanistan case was a 
foreign policy revolution and that the evolution of technology has reached such a 
level that a small Special Forces unit, combined with the American Air Force 
supremacy, can win by themselves any enemy, even without allies or with allies of 
questioned quality. At the same time and on the other hand, there was a less popular 
view that the Afghanistan case was a result of a series of fortunate events that had 
to do exclusively with that case so the same foreign policy cannot be applied 
anywhere else (Biddle, 2004). 
However, as Biddle (2004) highlights, none of those two views is exact and 
the reality is, as always, somewhere in the middle. The combination of the Special 
Forces with the Air Force can win any enemy yes but only on the condition that there 
are flexible and well trained ground forces that can take advantage of the airstrikes 
and smart bombs effectiveness and of course eliminate the resistance of the 
enemies that bombardments cannot strike. Consequently, the weak point of the 
American foreign policy is probably its allies. The American military forces face 
enemies who are most of the times willing and capable to fight till the end. As it is 
rational, for political reasons, the US can’t just deploy their whole army but they 
based mostly on clinical strikes, therefore, they need allies who possess at least an 
equal ability and will to fight as their enemies (Biddle, 2004). 
This realization may have some significant effects on the future planning of 
the American foreign policy in general and the use of Special Forces in particular. 
The outcome of the Afghanistan case does not indicate neither that the American 
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military forces need to be reconstructed so they will be fit to this kind of conflicts nor 
that the conventional forces should be used in every battle. The success of the 
Special Forces in Afghanistan is just a role model which can be undoubtedly used in 
the cases that the US are sure that they have local allies who are capable and willing 
to surmount their enemies (Robinson, 2013). Of course it is difficult to always have 
such favorable conditions as it happened in Afghanistan so the limitation of the 
conventional forces would be a dangerous choice for the US, despite the proved 
supremacy of the Special Forces and the Air Force. It is true that the smart weapons 
are not yet evolved at such level, even with the Special Forces guidance, of winning 
a war without the use of ground forces. There was indeed a wide use of smart 
weapons where the political and geographical factors almost forced their used, as it 
happened in Afghanistan and earlier in Kosovo, but those weapons are not adequate 
enough, maybe not just yet (Aylwin-Foster & Army, 2005). 
As long as the US allies have the sufficient ability and will, they can support 
the US Special Forces but the true outcome of the Afghanistan case is that the future 
foreign policy expressions in practice, as it already happened in the past ones, will 
continue to be in need of capable ground forces to take advantage of the technology. 
The combination of air and ground forces is even more effectively made by the 
existence of smart weapons but against determined enemies there must be a 
complementing use of every means possible in order to achieve the desired results 
(Biddle, 2004). 
This can be considered as a convergence point between the comparison of 
the two cases and their difference lies on the above findings. In the Iraq case, the US 
did not have any local allies, except for the Kurds in the north part of the country, and 
the army of Iraq was by far more powerful and better equipped than the Taliban 
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fighters and the Al Qaeda terrorists. Therefore the use of extended numbers of 
conventional forces was more than necessary for the reaching the desired success 
of the Iraqi Freedom operation (Alexander, 2006). Yes, the Special Forces played a 
decisive and definitive role in Iraq however due to the lack of local allies and the 
strong army forces of the opponent side it is highly debatable if the Special Forces 
could complete the Iraqi Freedom only by themselves, as they had done in 
Afghanistan. It is a fact that the Special Forces managed to succeed, almost solely, 
in the fights in north Iraq after the Turkish negation to allow the passage for the 
American conventional forces. In addition, the Special Forces were ahead of the 
conventional forces in the conflict theaters, usually occupying the key targets before 
the conventional forces even reach the area, and their heavy armory and the Javelin 
missiles allowed them to destroy the enemy’s conventional forces without any help 
(Cordesman, 2003). Yet again, despite all these significant and critical 
achievements, it is doubtful if the Special Forces would be able to occupy Baghdad 
or to destroy the Iraqi forces in the ferocious battles south of the capital without, at 
least, the support of the conventional forces. Even if they had been able to do so 
their losses would be devastating in personnel and equipment. It should be stressed 
though that the difference between the two cases lies on their different conditions, 
that are already mentioned above following the Biddle’s thought, and not in the very 
use of the Special Forces as from this aspect the general doctrine used in both 
cases is the same one used in the Enduring Freedom operation, just in a much 
larger scale in the Iraqi Freedom operation (Neville, 2012b). 
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Chapter VII: Outcomes and Epilogue 
 
I. Examining the use of Special Forces in the light of the recent 
developments in Iraq 
 
 From June 2014 until nowadays there have been happening things that are 
probably very much related to the subject that this paper is about. The extreme jihad 
terrorist organization which is self-proclaimed as Islamic State, having changed 
various names and shapes so far (IS, ISIl, ISI, ISIS etc.), emerged from one of the 
small terrorist groups which succeeded Al Qaeda to an unofficial yet functional state 
which, by using fear and terror as its main tool of empowerment, has in its control a 
large part of Iraq and Syria (Arango, 2015). 
 This transitional situation essentially started when Mosul, the second biggest 
city of Iraq, fell into the hands of the ISIS fighters in June 2014. The new Iraqi 
security forces that were organized, trained and equipped by the US, were the 
supposed defenders of the city of Mosul however they massively retreated and 
finally surrendered to an insurgents force which was much smaller in numbers and 
far worse equipped. The new Iraqi army fell apart and lost control of almost all the 
Sunni territories, maintaining only the Shiites areas and the city of Baghdad and 
letting Iraq get destroyed and split (Posen, 2014). 
The US Special Forces were called again to be the US main exponents to the try of 
ISIS deterrence as the return of conventional forces was out of the table. The 
Special Forces units went back to Iraq in order to equip, train and coordinate the 
Kurdish fighters and what was left of the Iraqi government. This time there was no 
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combat engagement by the US Special Forces, except for the clinical airstrikes, but 
their contribution and coordination helped to halt the ISIS march towards Kurdistan 
as well as towards Baghdad (BBC, 2014). 
All these developments are of course recent and refer to an ongoing conflict, so the 
subject is mainly covered by press articles and scientific works making the analysis 
of the facts not so precise as the Iraq/Afghanistan cases. However, the facts can be 
paralleled and compared. 
 The collapse of the new Iraqi army and the American failure, after the 
conventional forces were withdrawn, to stabilize and secure the area in favor of their 
foreign policy plans makes the dilemma of win or loss in Iraq to be seen under a new 
scope. Of course, General Petraeus (2008) and Major Gant (2009) have explained 
that we cannot examine this specific war through conventional concepts of victory or 
loss or even success or failure. Although, the total collapse of the succession state 
and the substantial recantation of all the efforts and sacrifices made by the soldiers 
show that it is a failure that burdens everyone involved, even the Special Forces 
(Bolger, 2014). 
However, can we just generalize and put the blame on the Special Forces? Well, if 
we take a quick look on the facts that the Special Forces were responsible for the 
Iraqi forces to be trained, organized and equipped then their collapse can be easily 
attributed to the Special Forces responsibilities, mistakes or omissions. Yet again 
such a simplistic explanation would be insufficient. It is a fact that the American 
Special Forces have successfully trained and organized the security forces of 
various states, Afghanistan included, and they followed the same approach in Iraq. 
This proves that it cannot be the defining factor for the failure, especially given the 
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fact that the succession state in Afghanistan still remains without the ISIS or any 
other terrorist group being able to threaten the stability there. 
Instead, the reason for the collapse soon after the conventional forces withdrew 
probably lies on external factors like the Arab Spring or the Syrian civil war that gave 
the ISIS a strong foundation to expand in Iraq. Those two events seem to have no 
influence in Afghanistan which is more isolated and the actions taken by the Special 
Forces there appear to withstand. 
 The new Iraqi army possessed 14 fully trained and equipped Divisions of 
infantry which, as said above, massively collapsed against to few in numbers Islamic 
fighters with light weapons (Posen, 2014). It was something that took by surprise 
almost everyone but it is fitted in the Biddle’s outcomes (2004) that were mentioned 
above. The Iraqi forces even though they had the training and the equipment did not 
have the will or the motives to fight against the ISIS fighters and of course they did 
not have the support by the US ground and air forces. We would say that when the 
new Iraqi soldiers had to fight by themselves they appeared faint-hearted against a 
very determined opponent (Posen, 2014). In the same reasoning made by Biddle we 
can see that the ISIS was held when the, US allied, Kurds or the Iraqi Shiites had the 
motive and the US Special Forces and Air Force support (BBC, 2014). However, in 
order to subvert the ISIS advantage in the Middle East territories, a significant 
number of high quality military is needed to complete the combination of Special 
Forces and airstrikes. Given that the US political administration, at least until now, 
does not appear willing to send new military forces in the area, the only way to deal 
with the matter is either the direct involvement by the local US allies, for example 
Turkey, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, or the gradual conversion of the irregular Kurds and 
Shiites fighters to a tactical army but without repeating the same mistakes as in the 
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new Iraqi army case. Both solutions are extremely difficult due to a sum of political 
and practical reasons; however it is more than obvious that the “Afghan model” has 
restrictions, meaning that even though the Special Forces can greatly contribute in 
the battle against ISIS, they cannot win this determined enemy by themselves. 
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II. Outcomes concerning the future use of the Special Forces 
 
If we take into consideration the above analysis of the Special Forces recent 
and older past uses we may formulate a view on their potential uses in the near 
future.  
First of all, the Special Forces now play a central role in the general American 
foreign policy planning and its execution and it is important that their potential are 
used as beneficial for the American government to their fullest. The main challenge 
is for the American foreign policy makers to successfully combine the Special Forces 
between them and with the conventional forces in order to take advantage of their 
capabilities and serve the foreign policy initiatives of the US all over the world 
(Robinson, 2012) 
The current American foreign policy strategy is based on small and dispersed 
worldwide Special Forces units which are ready to act directly against any challenge 
and in collaboration with their respective local allies. This foreign policy planning 
allows the Special Forces to play a strengthened role as their basic mission, when 
they are not engaged in battles, is to locate and train capable allied fighters. Those 
allied fighters are planned to gradually become capable enough in order to face the 
potential challenges within their country’s borders and of course to be reliable 
partners of the US foreign policy at a peripheral or global level (Robinson, 2012). 
When this strategy becomes essentially fruitful the demand for military interventions, 
including the use of the Special Forces, is going to be reduced in the theaters of 
operations wherever they may be. It is a crucial plan for the US foreign policy and it 
has to be achieved because so far the need for unilateral actions by the US side is 
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almost constantly high however; this is a phenomenon that has negative political 
consequences and the rarely it happens the better for the government. This plan 
therefore aims at the promotion of local leaders who will be capable to cooperate 
with the political and military leadership and have a good understanding of the 
national security terms and the foreign policymaking (Mazzetti, 2013). In other 
words, it will be beneficiary for the US and their foreign policy if the Special Forces 
act more as trainers than unilaterally engaging in conflicts. It is a recipe that was 
extensively used in Iraq and even though the Iraqi successor state failed, it showed 
very positive and promising signs, meaning that it can and it should be used again in 
the near future with the according corrections of course (Posen, 2014). 
The emphasis on this concept, along with the right corrections and the 
possible fortification where needed, it can offer many benefits to the American 
foreign policy. These may include: First of all, more possibilities for long-term 
solutions instead of temporary interventions or endless wars of attrition. Secondly, a 
stronger national security but with less cost as military forces outside the US will 
exist in smaller numbers and the responsibilities will be taken over by the capable 
and well trained allies. In general, the US will lead a stronger global alliance not 
having to act unilaterally or breach international rules, something that creates 
negativity and this can be used by the US opponents. This kind of foreign 
policymaking was applied in the Afghanistan case and it leaving very positive 
samples after its application (Wright, 2010). Following, therefore, the Afghanistan 
example and apply it extensively it will need the full participation of the political 
leadership, meaning that this model should be an official foreign policymaking 
strategy, with an increased budget for the USSOCOM in order to, in its turn, increase 
the potentials of the Special Forces. The US Congress will have to play a significant 
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role in general, by supporting the increase of the according budget as well as by 
monitoring the application of this policies since it is a very sensitive issue and in the 
case of the wrong application there can exist many negative consequences for the 
government (Priest & Arkin, 2011). 
However, in a realistic approach of the matter, the application of these new 
foreign policies is expected to be very difficult due to the usual bureaucratic 
obstacles but also due to the general lack of knowledge of what exactly are the 
Special Forces and what they do. Substantially, they are the most precise and vital 
military body of the US as, among their other responsibilities, they conduct the 
counter-terrorism operations which may include neutralization or extermination of 
terrorists, saving hostages or destroying weapons of mass destruction; such abilities 
should be kept at a great level and even be meliorated. This improvement can be 
achieved through the adoption of the above suggestions, enabling the Special 
Forces to cooperate with their partners and allies at an extensive range of political 
and military actions, which in their turn they can improve the very national security of 
the allied countries. After all, as the men of the Special Forces explain, to achieve 
victory you don’t just kill the enemy but you have to act in an extremely more 
elaborate and complicated way (Robinson, 2012). 
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